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Health Care Rationing and
Disability Rights
PHILIP G. PETERS, JR.*
"Should somebody at some level be in a position to say no?"'
-Senator John C. Danforth
INTRODUCTION
By publicly suggesting to Hillary Rodham Clinton that potentially beneficial
health care should sometimes be rationed, Senator Danforth touched "one of
the rawest nerves in the health-care debate."2 The examples he used frame
the issue-nicely:
* A baby kept alive in Virginia by respirator although she has
almost no brain;3
Siamese twins surgically separated by a procedure that would
kill one and give the other only a one percent chance of
survival;4
Aggressive treatment of very low birth weight babies with a
less than fifteen percent chance of functioning;
* Providing a pacemaker to a ninety-two-year-old man.
Danforth could easily have given other examples, such as the Florida family
which insisted upon dialysis for a family member in a persistent vegetative
state5 or the suggested protocol of taking six sequential stool guaiacs to test
for colon cancer detected by the final sample at a cost of forty-seven million
dollars per case.6
* Ruth L. Hulston Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. J.D., University of
California at Berkeley, 1976; B.A., Harvard University, 1972. Thanks to E. Haavi Morreim, Paige Sipes-
Meltzer, Michael Middleton, and Lisa Key for comments on an earlier draft of this Article. Research
for this Article was partially funded by the John K. Hulston Faculty Research Fellowship in Health Law
and the John W. Maupin Faculty Research Fellowship.
1. Charlotte Grimes, Some Health Rationing Needed, Danforth Says, ST. Louis PosT-DSPATCH,
Oct. 1, 1993, at 5C (quoting from proceedings before the Senate Finance Committee on the previous
day). Ms. Clinton responded: ."I would agree for both moral and ethical-reasons, as well as economic
ones, there has to be the kind of difficult conversation that you are suggesting."' Id. She suggested that
the debate should wait until passage of a bill providing all Americans with insurance coverage. See also
Melinda Beck, Rationing Health Care, NEWSWEEK, June 27, 1994, at 30.
2. Grimes, supra note I, at 5C.
3. He may have had in mind the recent case of Baby K. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D.
Va. 1993), affid, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994). Her care reportedly cost
$246,000 through mid-June for hospital care alone; she resides in a nursing home when not hospitalized.
Jane B. Quinn, Taking Back Health Care, NEwswEEK, June 27, 1994, at 36.
4. Danforth may have been referring to the Lakeberg Siamese twins, whose unsuccessful care
reportedly cost $1.3 million. See Beck, supra note 1, at 30.
5. Judith W. Ross, The Puzzle of the Permanently Unconscious, HASTINGS CIR. REP., May-June
1992, at 2, 3.
6. TOM L. BEAuCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 232 (3d ed.
1989) (discussing stool guaiacs). This is a sequential testing procedure used for colon cancer which, on
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Any criterion suggested for rationing health care will be controversial. The
stakes are high and no popular or ethical consensus has emerged. But
allocation decisions are omnipresent and their continuation is inevitable.
Common sense tells us to give priority to services that do the most good. As
a result, an approach which would eliminate only the least beneficial or least
cost-effective treatments has considerable potential appeal. It offers both the
promise of maximizing health care outcomes from limited resources and the
surface allure of scientific objectivity and nonpartisan neutrality. Not
surprisingly, both the use and the advocacy of effectiveness measurements
have expanded significantly in recent years.
But rationing the least effective care has a dark side beneath its venire of
objectivity. Any health care allocation scheme which attempts to maximize
health care outcomes by giving priority to the most effective treatments has
the potential to disfavor disabled patients and others, such as the elderly and
the frail, whose quality of life is most impaired or whose conditions are most
resistant to cure. As a result, the use of effectiveness criteria to allocate health
resources may be challenged as violating society's commitment to equality in
general, and to protection of those with the greatest need in particular.
The resolution of this conflict between efficiency and equality has dramatic
implications for health policy. Although it surfaced most prominently when
the State of Oregon attempted to obtain federal waivers for its health care
rationing plan, the conflict is not unique to Oregon's plan or even to
government programs. It arises whenever effectiveness or cost-effectiveness
is used by health care providers or insurers to determine which treatments to
provide or insure. Those instances range from bedside decisions by clinicians
to macroallocation decisions by benefit plans about coverage of conditions
such as AIDS, infertility, or mental illness. In each setting, allocations based
on medical utility have the potential to disfavor some patients on the basis of
their disability.
This Article explores the extent to which federal disability rights law limits
the use of effectiveness criteria to allocate health care, either alone or as a
part of cost-effectiveness analyses. To be more precise, it considers the
circumstances in which disability-based classifications by health plans which
would otherwise violate the anti-discrimination laws can be legally and
ethically defended by proof that the excluded treatments are less effective
than those which are provided.
Part I introduces the expanding use of effectiveness analysis in health care,
explains its discriminatory potential, and reviews the Oregon experience. Part
II outlines the current federal law protecting the rights of disabled persons to
health care. The remaining portions of this Article examine, first, whether
measures of effectiveness that do not take quality of life into account, such
as survival rates, violate the rights of disabled persons (Part III), and, second,
the sixth try, detects three cases for each one million patients tested. Each case detected costs S47
million (in 1975 dollars). See Duncan Neuhauser & Ann M. Lewicki, What Do We Gain From the Sixth
Stool Guaiac?, 293 NEW ENG. J. MED. 226, 227 tbl. 2 (1975).
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whether the additional issues raised by quality of life considerations preclude
their use (Part IV). While the arguments for prohibiting the use of measures
of effectiveness such as survival or success rates are surprisingly powerful,
they are not sufficient to outweigh the ethical and legal arguments for
permitting their use in proper circumstances. Quality of life considerations are
more troublesome. When used to rank life-sustaining care, they would place
a lesser value on the life of a disabled person than on the life of a person who
could be restored to full function. If used in that way, quality of life
considerations will probably be held to violate the existing disability rights
laws. But because quality of life is relevant, even in the context of life-
extending care, it is time to begin discussing the circumstances in which to
authorize its use.
The objective of this essay is to make a preliminary exploration of the legal
and ethical legitimacy of using medical effectiveness as a criterion for the
allocation of health resources. The vulnerability of health-care plans which
take the effectiveness of treatments into account, however, will also depend
upon the resolution of several other crucially important legal issues not
addressed here. For example, some court opinions appear to suggest that plans
which favor one disability over another are less vulnerable to challenge than
those which treat people without disabilities more favorably than persons with
disabilities.7 Also, considerable confusion currently exists as to the vulnera-
bility of exclusions which have a disproportionately unfavorable impact on
disabled patients but which do not make facial classifications on the basis of
disability (e.g., a limit on blood transfusions that disproportionately affects
hemophiliacs).' Health insurers have also suggested, so far unsuccessfully,
that the anti-discrimination statutes do not apply to coverage restrictions
7. See, e.g., Turnage v. Turner, 485 U.S. 535, 549 (1988) ("There is nothing in [Section 504] that
requires that any benefit extended to one category of handicapped persons also be extended to all other
categories of handicapped persons.'); Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704, 708-10 (3d Cir. 1979); Duquette
v. Dupuis, 582 F. Supp. 1365, 1370-72 (D.N.H. 1984); Doe v. Devine, 545 F. Supp. 576, 585 (D.D.C.
1982) (noting that equal benefits are not required, but in fact were provided), aftd, 703 F.2d 1319 (D.C.
Cir. 1983). But see McGuire v. Switzer, 734 F. Supp. 99, 114-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the
plaintiff had established a cause of action under § 504 based on the state's higher tuition and
maintenance reimbursement to blind individuals as compared to reimbursement to other disabled
individuals).
8. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-302 (1985)
(assuming without deciding that Section 504 reaches "at least some conduct that has an unjustifiable
disparate impact upon the handicapped" and making a powerful argument that this assumption is
appropriate, but imposing a novel "meaningful access" test); and 28 C.F.R., pt. 35, app. A § 35.130,
at 449 (1994) with EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, INTERIM GUIDANCE ON DISABILITY-
BASED DISTiNcnTONs IN HEALTH CARE PLANS (June 6, 1983) [hereinafter EEOC, INTERIM GUIDANCE],
reprinted in 2 Accommodating Disabilities (CCH) 140,150, at 140,022 n.1, 140,024 n.7 (assuming that
the disparate impact theory is unavailable under the ADA or Section 504). The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC') has since indicated that it might change its position as to the
availability of the disparate impact theory. FACILITY HEALTH MANAGEMENT, HEALTH LAW FOCUS
(CCH), Dec. 21, 1993, at 2, 2-3 (reporting remarks to the Labor Relations Section of the District of
Columbia Bar by Peggy Mastroianna, director of EEOC's Americans with Disabilities Act policy
division (Nov. 23, 1993)).
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placed on private health insurance." The resolution of each of these issues
could have a profound impact on the freedom of health plans to prioritize
health services and deserves separate and extended analysis. In addition, the
discussion which follows examines rationing at the level of health benefit
plans. Bedside rationing by physicians raises many of the same issues, but it
also poses additional issues which justify separate consideration and which
may limit the application of my conclusions in that setting.10
I. RATIONING THE LEAST BENEFICIAL CARE
Health economists have worked for decades on methodologies for
calculating both the effectiveness and the cost-effectiveness of health care
expenditures." Originally utilized to compare the value of different treat-
ments for the same disease, these methods were later used to compare the
cost-effectiveness of treatments for different diseases. Cost-effectiveness
calculations have the appeal of incorporating outcomes research, patient
9. See Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994)
(holding that the district court erred when it dismissed the plaintiff's claim on the ground that insurance
plans were not public accommodations under the ADA and remanding the case for further determination
on the issue); Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Donaghey, 2 AD Cases 1745 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (holding that such plans are covered entities under the ADA); see also 28 C.F.L, pt. 36, app. B.
§ 36.212 (1994) (discussing industry comments on the issue and concluding that insurance plans are
covered by the ADA). But see DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR TASK FORCE, REPORT ON THE EFFECT OF
THE AMERICANS wiTH DISABILITES ACT ON EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH PLANS 83-85 (1993)
(questioning the applicability of the ADA to the terms of insurance policies). Monica McFadden's
analysis of the legislative history, statute, and regulations strongly suggests that private insurance plans
should be treated as covered public accommodations. Monica E. McFadden, Insurance Benefits under
the ADA: Discrimination or Business as Usual?, 28 TORT & INSUR. LJ. 480, 485-86 (1993).
10. Unless physicians possess comparative data about other borderline treatments and about the cut-
off dictated by current resources, they will be poorly positioned to make defensible judgments about
relative cost-effectiveness. In addition, the necessity of their making these decisions is placed in doubt
if the treatment is covered by a health benefits plan. On the other hand, physicians have traditionally
been delegated substantial responsibility in the health sector to act as stewards of societal resources. In
addition, they will ordinarily be in the best position to make individualized assessments of treatment
effectiveness. Whether the disability rights laws should restrict their authority to make these decisions
is therefore a difficult question which requires separate discussion. See also infra notes 195 (discussing
satisfaction of the individualization requirement) and 231 (discussing other differences between health
plan and bedside rationing in the context of quality of life considerations).
11. The history of Quality-Adjusted Life Years ("QALYs") is briefly described in John La Puma,
Quality-Adjusted Life Years: Ethical Implications and the Oregon Plan, 7 IssuEs L. & MED. 429, 433-
34 (1992) (expanding upon John La Puma & Edward F. Lawlor, Quality-Adjusted Life-Years: Ethical
Implications for Physicians and Policymakers, 263 JAMA 2917 (1990)). American researchers initially
derived the methodology from operations research in engineering and mathematics, using it in the health
care setting to measure the tradeoff between survival and quality of life that is implicated by some
treatment choices such as conservative care versus aggressive care. See id. The British, most notably
Alan Williams, then borrowed the concept as a way of suggesting priorities in their national health care
system. See, e.g., Alan Williams, Economics of Coronary Artery Bypass Grafting, 291 BRIT. MED. J.
326 (1985). More recently, QALYs have been calculated for a number of treatments in the United
States. See, e.g., Michael J. Barry et al., Watchful Waiting vs Immediate Transurethral Resection for
Symptomatic Prostatism: The Importance of Patients' Preferences, 259 JAMA 3010, 3011 (1988)
(discussing Quality-Adjusted Life Months ("QALMs")); Milton C. Weinstein, Estrogen Use in
Postmenopausal Women-Costs, Risks and Benefits, 303 NEw ENG. J. MED. 308 (1980).
[Vol. 70:491
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preferences, and expected costs into a rational and potentially sophisticated
scheme for maximizing health care outcomes from the available resources.
A. Effectiveness Analysis
Theoretically, at least, calculating the effectiveness of a medical service is
relatively straightforward. This calculation involves both an estimate of the
likely outcomes and an assignment of value to those outcomes. The value
assigned to an outcome is determined by the impact which the treatment is
expected to have on a patient's quality of life. That value is then adjusted to
reflect the probability and duration of the expected benefit. 2 The product of
this calculus is a single unit which expresses the number and quality of
additional years that the treatment is likely to confer. These outcome units
have been called both Quality-Adjusted Life Years ("QALYs") 3 and Well
Years.' 4 Oregon's controversial prioritization was the first large-scale effort
to use QALYs for resource allocation in the United States. 5
The theoretical value of these calculations cannot be overstated. They
provide a common unit of measurement which permits treatments for different
diseases to be compared on the basis of their expected benefit or their cost-
effectiveness. 6 Using QALYs or their equivalents, comparisons can be made
between such disparate treatments as AZT, autologous bone marrow
12. E.g., OREGON HEALTH SERVS. COMM'N, PRIORITIZATION OF HEALTH SERVICES: A REPORT TO
THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE apps. C, D (1991); Robert M. Kaplan & John P. Anderson, A
General Health Policy Model: Update and Applications, 23 HSR: HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 203
(1988); La Puma, supra note 11, at 429; Milton C. Weinstein & William B. Stason, Foundations of
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for Health and Medical Practices, 296 NEW ENG. J. MED. 716, 718-19
(1977).
13. E.g., Williams, supra note 11, at 326-27; Weinstein & Stason, supra note 12, at 719.
14. E.g., Kaplan & Anderson, supra note 12, at 207-08; Robert M. Kaplan & James W. Bush,
Health-Related Quality of Life Measurement for Evaluation Research and Policy Analysis, I HEALTH
PSYCHOL. 61, 64-65 (1982).
15. David C. Hadom, The Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise: Quality of Life and Public Polcy,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., May-June 1991, at Supp. 11, 14 [hereinafter Hadom, Oregon Priority-Setting
Exercise]; see David C. Hadom, Setting Health Care Priorities in Oregon: Cost-Effectiveness Meets the
Rule of Rescue, 265 JAMA 2218 (1991) [hereinafter Hadom, Setting Health Care Priorities] (describing
the original Oregon methodology and the modifications undertaken before submission to the Federal
Government for approval).
16. La Puma, supra note 11, at 431; Alan Maynard, Logic in Medicine: An Economic Perspective,
295 BRIT. MED. J. 1537, 1540 (1987). John Rawles includes several helpful illustrations of comparisons
based on cost-effectiveness:
For example, a patient with severe arthritis of the hip who is unable to work and is in severe
distress scores a quality of life of 0.7 [using a Rosser and Kind scale]. His expectation of life
of 10 years is reduced to seven quality adjusted life years. Successful hip replacement, by
eliminating disability and distress, restores 3 QALYs to his total, at an average cost of £750
per QALY.
Another example is a patient with renal failure undergoing renal dialysis twice a week in
hospital for a year. He is unable to work and suffers moderate distress with a quality of life
of 0.9. However, hemodialysis is life-saving, so every year adds 0.9 to the number of QALYs
he would otherwise enjoy, at a cost of £14000 per QALY.
John Rawles, Castigating QALYs, 15 J. MED. ETHICS 143, 144-45 (1989) (citations omitted); see also
George W. Torrance, Measurement ofHealth State Utilitiesfor Economic Appraisal, 5 J. HEALTH ECON.
1, 6 tbl. 1 (1986); Williams, supra note 11, at 328 (comparing coronary artery bypass grafting with heart
transplantation, treatment of end stage renal failure, and hip replacement).
1995]
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transplants, infertility treatments, mammography screening, early CT scans for
head pain, and heroic care for patients in persistent vegetative states. As a
result, QALYs provide information that is potentially very useful when
deciding which costly or marginally effective treatments to provide.
As the health economist David Hadorn has emphasized, reliable cost-
effectiveness data will help health care providers minimize human suffering
to the maximum extent possible with the resources society allocates to health
care.'7 They do so by directing available resources to their most beneficial
use.
Current insurance and clinical practices often make the same kinds of
calculations regarding treatment value and cost, albeit in a more intuitive
manner.'" Today, these untutored perceptions not only influence the choice
of treatments and conditions to exclude or restrict (such as mental health
problems, AIDS, and infertility), but they can also play a role in decisions
about whether a treatment is "experimental,' 9 "medically necessary,"20 or
"futile."'" Prioritization is not a new idea, but current practices leave
considerable room for faulty assumptions and for prejudice against some
diseases. They may also rely on cost without considering effectiveness.
QALYs can help improve the process, making it more rational and, therefore,
more just.
QALYs also help us to reexamine old assumptions, habits, and biases.22
They permit health planners to ask whether our current allocation practices
have given too much or too little priority to research on lethal diseases such
as cancer or heart disease, as compared to debilitating diseases such as
arthritis and dementia. They provide a tool for examining whether our current
slighting of chronic disease, preventive care, or mental health is defensible
17. Hadorn, Setting Health Care Priorities, supra note 15, at 2225; see also Williams, supra note
11, at 328-29.
18. See, e.g., David M. Eddy, What Care Is 'Essential'? What Services Are 'Basic'?, 265 JAMA
782, 788 (1991); Gavin Mooney, QALYs: Are They Enough?: A Health Economist's Perspective, 15 J.
MED. ETHICS 148 (1989).
19. Insurers are reportedly increasing their scrutiny of new medical technologies, demanding
stronger proof that they will provide significant benefits. Examples include some bone marrow
transplants (costing $150,000 to $200,000), the drug taxol for treatment of breast and other cancers
($18,000), and photopheresis for lymph cancer ($22,800). Roger Signor, Cost Curbs High-Tech Health
Care, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 21, 1993, at Dl, D17.
20. For example, fewer resources are expended on intensive care units for patients with poorer
prognoses. Albert G. Mulley, The Allocation of Resources for Medical Intensive Care, in PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, in 3 SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES
IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES 285, 302, 306 (1983) [hereinafter SECURING ACCESS TO
HEALTH CARE].
21. Mildred Solomon points out that physicians use medical language such as "futility" and
"medically indicated" to mask value judgments about the adequacy of benefits conferred by treatments.
Mildred Z. Solomon, How Physicians Talk About Futility: Making Words Mean Too Many Things, 21
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 231 (1993). The result is to empower physicians and disempower patients and
families. Id. at 236; see also S. Van McCrary et al., Physicians' Quantitative Assessment of Medical
Futility, 5 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 100, 102 (1994) (noting that physicians consider lifesaving treatment
futile if the odds of success fall below a cutoff point, but they lack a consensus about where the cutoff
point should be).
22. See Maynard, supra note 16, at 1540-41.
[Vol. 70:491
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and for questioning the legitimacy of restrictions on treatments for AIDS or
mental illness.
QALYs may also help health decision-makers to avoid what David Eddy has
called "rationing by meat ax."'23 By excluding the least effective treatments
for conditions that ordinarily are covered by insurance, savings could be
generated to fund more comprehensive coverage of treatments for conditions
such as mental health that are typically excluded or restricted. Blanket
restrictions on treatments for infertility or mental health, for example, could
be replaced by narrower exclusions of only those treatments which are least
effective.
In addition, the exclusion of whole groups of uninsured persons from
programs such as Medicaid could be replaced by the exclusion of marginally
effective care. Oregon, for example, replaced a Medicaid system in which a
six-year-old child was eligible when a seven-year-old was not, in which
pregnant women had coverage but other women did not, and in which single
adults with children were covered but those without children or with a spouse
were excluded. In its place, the State has instituted a system that provides
protection for more people by prioritizing the treatments covered.24
QALYs make the basis for those choices more explicit and, in the case of
Oregon, more public. Consequently, they force conscious confrontation of the
difficult value judgments that must be made in order to compare the benefits
of one treatment, such as hip replacement, against those of another quite
different treatment, such as AZT. 25 This explicit attention to the difficult
choices is in marked contrast to current practices, such as those of physicians
who use neutral terms such as "futility" to mask intuitive judgments about the
value of treatment to the patient.26 These judgments should be made explicit
and should be defended. QALYs provide a framework for structuring that
debate.
At the same time, effectiveness analysis need not replace all other bases for
allocating health care. It can be combined with more egalitarian strategies for
23. David M. Eddy, Rationing by Patient Choice, 265 JAMA 105, 106 (1991).
24. Norman Daniels, Is the Oregon Rationing Plan Fair?, 265 JAMA 2232, 2232 (1991); David
M. Eddy, What's Going on in Oregon?, 266 JAMA 417,419 (1991) ("Oregon proposes to expand who
is... but to contract what is covered... ."'). Compare the approach of Missouri, which spent nearly
$1 million keeping Nancy Cruzan alive in a persistent vegetative state, while providing Medicaid for
only 40% of its citizens below the poverty level. Leonard M. Fleck, Just Health Care Rationing: A
Democratic Decisionmaking Approach, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1597, 1611 (1992).
25. See Maynard, supra note 16, at 1540 (shifting the debate to the accuracy of the measurements
of cost and benefit).
26. See Ronald Cranford & Lawrence Gostin, Futility: A Concept in Search of a Definition, 20 L.
MED. & HEALTH CARE 307, 308 (1992); Solomon, supra note 21, at 236 (criticizing physicians' use
of language such as "futility" and "medically indicated" to mask value judgments about treatment
decisions).
27. See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 24, at 2234 (arguing that fairness requires public scrutiny);
La Puma, supra note 11, at 431-32. Contra James F. Blurnstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A
Constitutional, Legal, and Policy Analysis, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1354, 1373 (1981); see also GuIDo
CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBrIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 34-41, 49,78, 145, 195-99 (1978) (arguing that public
political choices endanger basic values about the sanctity of life, but advance values of openness and
honesty).
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distributing health care to obtain the desired mix of medical utility and
equity.28 For example, patients with the greatest need could be given
preferential access to treatment whenever their expected benefit is the same
or sufficiently close to that of other patients who are better off. Alternatively,
expected benefit could establish a threshold for eligibility after which
allocation could be based on urgency or priority in time.
Finally, the measurement of treatment effectiveness is potentially useful in
many different contexts. Most obviously, it could be used by state or federal
governments, as Oregon initially attempted, to determine which treatments
will be funded. Prior to Oregon's skirmish with the Federal Government in
1991, eighteen states had proposed preliminary health care reforms modeled
after the Oregon plan. 29 Employers, private insurers, and patients are also
likely to find cost-effectiveness information helpful when making decisions
about the kind of coverage to offer or purchase. Indeed, Ellman and Hall have
made the intriguing suggestion that consumers be permitted to select between
health plans whose principal difference would be variations in cost-effective-
ness standards.3" Cost-effectiveness models could also help managed care
plans design protocols to determine which diagnostic tests to perform and
when to refer patients to specialists. The data may play a similar role in the
design of clinical practice guidelines. 31 Furthermore, cost-effectiveness has
always played a role in decisions about preventive care, such as when and
28. Maynard, supra note 16, at 1540. For example, a Massachusetts task force endorsed a tradeoff
between equity and utility in its organ transplantation program by using a two-tier process for selecting
recipients. Dan W. Brock, Ethical Issues in Recipient Selection for Organ Transplantation, in ORGAN
SUBSTITUTION TECHNOLOGY: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY IssuEs 86, 96 (Deborah Mathieu
ed., 1988) (citing MASSACHUSETrS TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, DEP'T OF PUB.
HEALTH, REPORT (1984)). First, an initial pool would be selected on "objective medical grounds," and
second, selection from the pool would be made on a first-come, first-served basis. The precise tradeoff
would depend on how restrictively the initial medical criteria are drawn. Id. at 96-97.
29. Eric L. Robinson, Note, The Oregon Basic Health Services Act: A Model for State Reform?, 45
VAND. L. REv. 977,978-79 (1992) (citing B.D. Colen, Strong Medicine, HEALTH, May 1991, at 32,34).
Florida may act to prioritize treatments and limit payment for those with low priority such as treatments
for flu and premature infants of less than 20 weeks. See Florida Legislator Outlines State's Next Reform
Steps, CCH PULSE: THE HEALTH CARE REFORM NEwSLETTER, Aug. 26, 1993, at 7.
30. Ira Mark Ellman & Mark A. Hall, Redefining the Terms of Health Insurance to Accommodate
Varying Consumer Risk Preferences, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 193 (1993). This would be accomplished
by marketing plans with different fixed budgets to be used for treatment (e.g., $2 million per 1000
subscribers per year). Higher budget plans could fund less cost-effective care. These budgets would
define the plan's contractual obligations and replace the standard policy language requiring payment of
all appropriate medical care not excluded. Id. at 194. Decisions about how to allocate the finite resources
of a particular plan would raise the same disability rights issues discussed in this Article.
31. See, e.g., Florida Legislator Outlines State's Next Reform Steps, supra note 29, at 7 (reporting
that an architect of Florida's health care reform plan wishes to pass legislation to establish "cost-
effective" practice parameters as an affirmative defense to malpractice suits); Hadorn, Setting Health
Care Priorities, supra note 15, at 2223-24 (recommending the use of effectiveness data for setting
practice guidelines and suggesting that practice guidelines serve as a basis for allocating health care).
For an introduction to the subject of practice parameters, the impetus for increasing their number, and
the issues raised by their use, see John D. Blum, Hospitals, New Medical Practice Guidelines, CQI and
Potential Liability Outcomes, 36 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 913 (1992). Congress has charged the Forum for
Health Care Policy Research-an entity within the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research-with
the development of practice guidelines based on current medical research. Id. at 919. The medical
community itself is also moving toward more outcome measurements and guidelines. Id. at 921-22.
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whom to screen for diseases such as breast cancer, diabetes during pregnancy,
sickle cell disease, and Tay-Sachs disease.32 In all of these contexts,
decision-making could potentially improve with the benefit of valid, reliable
measurements of treatment effectiveness.
But measurement of medical effectiveness also presents serious methodo-
logical and ethical problems which must be surmounted before its use
expands. The methodological problems arise both from the difficulty of
obtaining adequate data about outcomes, benefits, and costs and also from
predictable issues of study design.33 Problems of this kind contributed to the
failure of Oregon's initial attempt to prioritize medical treatments entirely on
the basis of net benefit.34 Unquestionably, the field is still in its infancy, but
there is reason to believe that the data will improve in both quality and
quantity.35 And because even crude effectiveness measurements have the
32. See CHARLES H. HENNEKENS & JUNE E. BURING, EPIDEMIOLOGY IN MEDICINE 328-30 (1981)
(stating that cost-effectiveness is one criterion for deciding when to perform medical screening).
33. For a taste of the issues, see Norman Daniels, Four Unsolved Rationing Problems, 24 HASTINGS
CM. REP., July-Aug. 1994, at 27, 28 (discussing the Aggregation Problem); David M. Eddy, Oregon's
Plan: Should It Be Approved?, 266 JAMA 2439 (1991); Eddy, supra note 23; Eddy, supra note 18;
Hadorn, Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise, supra note 15; La Puma, supra note 11, at 430-31, 434;
Mooney, supra note 18 (describing generally issues such as the assumption of risk-neutrality and
nonconstant marginal utilities, and suggesting refinements using weighting, regret theory, and prospect
theory); Rachel Rosser & Paul Kind, A Scale of Valuations of States of Illness: Is There a Social
Consensus?, 7 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 347 (1978) (providing an example of an attempt to develop a
scale representing the relative degrees of undesirability of certain health conditions and of death);
Torrance, supra, note 16, at 18 (explaining the choice between rating scales, standard gamble, and time
trade-off). For a further discussion of methodological problems, see infra notes 34, 200, and 202-03.
34. Problems with an initial list proposed in May, 1990, led Oregon to abandon pure cost-
effectiveness and substitute a more subjective, multifactorial methodology before submitting its plan for
federal approval in 1991. David M. Eddy, Oregon's Methods: Did Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Fail?,
266 JAMA 2135 (1991); Eddy, supra note 33, at 2444. In David Eddy's view, Oregon's inability to
estimate accurately either cdsts or benefits precluded reliance on its initial list. Id. at 2444. Categories
of services and outcomes were defined too broadly. See id.; Eddy, supra, at 2138. For example, "trouble
speaking" could range from mild lisp to mutism. Id. Duration of treatment benefits was poorly
differentiated. Eddy, supra note 24, at 417. Cost data were incomplete or inaccurate. Id.; Eddy, supra,
at 2138. And the list generated serious doubts whether the values assigned to treatment outcomes,
especially lifesaving treatments, had been accurately measured. Eddy, supra note 24, at 417; Eddy,
supra, at 2138-41.
Counter-intuitive rankings resulted from these problems. Reportedly, "bum over large areas of the
body" scored the same as an "upset stomach." Hadom, Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise, supra note 15,
at 16. Michael Astrue, then-general counsel of the Department of Health and Human Services, was
startled that treatments for ectopic pregnancies and appendicitis were ranked below some dental caps
and splints for temporomandibular joint disorder. Michael J. Astrue, Pseudoscience and the Law: The
Case of the Oregon Medicaid Rationing Experiment, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 375, 379 (1994); see also
Hadom, Setting Health Care Priorities, supra note 15, at 2219 (suggesting that the results were the
"inevitable consequence" of cost-effectiveness analysis). Oregon's rankings were sharply criticized.
Daniels, supra note 24, at 2235 (1991) (citing William B. Schwartz & Henry J. Aaron, The Achilles
Heel of Health Care Rationing, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1990, at A17). After scrapping the initial list, the
Oregon Health Services Commission explained that "a ranking based on benefit or cost-benefit ratio did
not comprehensively reflect public values." OREGON HEALTH SERVS. COMM'N, supra note 12, at 12.
Unwillingness to accept the implications of cost-effectiveness analysis, especially for the prioritization
of noncritical care over life-extending care, may also partially explain the adverse reaction to this list.
Hadom, Setting Health Care Priorities, supra note 15, at 2219 (discussing the "Rule of Rescue").
Oregon's revised methodology is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 49-54.
35. E.g., BEAUCHAMI' & CHILDRESS, supra note 6, at 247 (stating that the problems were not fatal
but suggesting caution); Robert M. Kaplan, A Quality-of-Life Approach to Health Resource Allocation,
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potential to improve on existing practices in a wide variety of contexts, a
substantial incentive exists to obtain and use the best available data.
Nonetheless, efforts to overcome the difficulties with effectiveness measures
would be misplaced if ranking treatment on this basis were intrinsically
unjust.
B. Disciiminatory Implications
In order to calculate a treatment's medical effectiveness, analysts must
estimate its probable outcome and then place a value on that outcome. Both
steps could disfavor disabled patients. When outcomes are taken into account,
patients with preexisting disabilities, such as diabetes, cancer, or pulmonary
disease, could be disfavored because they often have more difficulty fighting
unrelated illnesses (comorbidity) than patients who are otherwise healthy.' 6
For example, diabetes reduces the probable effectiveness of some treatments
for serious heart ailments." Unchecked alcoholism, another disability, could
interfere with the success of organ transplantation."8 When a disability-
related comorbidity causes poorer outcomes, reliance on outcomes to allocate
medical care would disfavor care of the affected disabled patients.
in RATIONING AMERICA'S MEDICAL CARE: THE OREGON PLAN AND BEYOND 60, 70, 74-75 (Martin A.
Strosberg et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter RATIONING AMERICA'S MEDICAL CARE] (suggesting that bad
data and time pressures, rather than methodological flaws, plagued Oregon's experiment and that
sensitivity analysis near the cutoff would be useful); Eddy, supra note 34, at 2138-41 (suggesting that
improved survey instruments could better capture public values about lifesaving); Eddy, supra note 33,
at 2444 (suggesting that more precise categories of services would better identify ineffective care);
Torrance, supra note 16, at 27-28 (concluding that imprecision can be ameliorated by a larger sample
size and careful sensitivity analysis). The current emphasis on medical outcomes research should permit
both more precise and more reliable QALY calculations. See, e.g., WILLIAM . CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH
CARE LAW, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 809 (4th ed. 1990) (describing establishment of
the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research to develop practice guidelines based on its research
findings); Blum, supra note 3 1, at 921-22; Beck, supra note 1, at 31; Geoffrey Cowley, What High Tech
Can't Accomplish, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 4, 1993, at 60, 63.
36. See, e.g., David C. Hadorn, The Problem ofDiscrimination in Health Care Priority Setting, 268
JAMA 1454, 1457-58 (1992) (noting poorer outcomes commonly associated with de facto disabilities
such as severe diabetes or cancer); David Orentlicher, Rationing and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 271 JAMA 308, 310 (1994) (recognizing that patients with pulmonary disease are poor candidates
for coronary bypass surgery). In another example, an HMO denied payment for a $170,000 liver
transplant requested by an e-antigen positive hepatitis-B patient due to the high rate of reinfection of
e-antigen positive patients and the liver shortage. Barnett v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., Health Care
Facility Mgmt. (CCH) 22,594 (N.D. Cal. 1993). The HMO's eight-member advisory board had
concluded that transplantation was not an appropriate medical treatment for the patient's condition. The
federal district court ruled that the HMO had not abused its discretion in considering this factor, even
though transplantation might be the patient's only chance of survival. The disability rights laws were
apparently not addressed.
37. OREGON HEALTH SERvS. COMM'N, supra note 12, at 61; Hadorn, supra note 36, at 1457-58.
38. The Federal Government apparently felt that this was the basis for Oregon's unfavorable
treatment of alcoholic cirrhosis relative to other causes of liver failure. OREGON HEALTH SERvS.
COMM'N, supra note 12, app. J (Prioritized Health Services List of May 1, 1991) (ranking transplan-
tation for alcoholic cirrhosis of liver at #690, and other cirrhoses at #366). The Federal Government
challenged this classification, pointing out that success does not depend upon etiology if the patient has
stopped the destructive behavior. See ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health Care Plan (Attachment to
Letter from Louis W. Sullivan to Governor Barbara Roberts (Aug. 3, 1992)), reprinted in 9 ISSUES L.
& MED. 397, 409, 411-12 (1994) [hereinafter Sullivan Letter]. Oregon had not limited its unfavorable
classification to active alcoholics.
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In addition, seriously disabled patients could be disfavored when values are
placed on treatment outcomes. For example, QALY use disfavors lifesaving
care for patients who are expected to be disabled after treatment, because
saving the life of a disabled person with an impaired quality of life will
theoretically generate fewer quality-adjusted life years than saving the life of
a person whose quality of life after treatment would be better (according to
the quality of life scales used for this measurement). The Federal Government
apparently suspected that the low ranking which Oregon gave to the treatment
of very low birth weight, premature babies reflected this kind of calcula-
tion.39
QALYs could also disadvantage permanently disabled patients who need
noncritical care. Their disabilities can limit the extent of their improvement
from successful therapy. 0 Consequently, their quality of life will improve
less than that of otherwise healthy patients who need the same therapy. As
these examples illustrate, disabled patients can be disfavored when treatment
effectiveness is measured by its impact on quality of life.
The chance that disabled patients will fare unfavorably in QALY calcula-
tions is further accentuated by the risk that the scales used to measure quality
of life will unfairly underestimate the quality of life of disabled persons."
This was precisely the Federal Government's criticism of the Oregon quality
of life measurements.42
Yet, until the Oregon plan was submitted for Federal Government approval,
no public attention had been called to the discriminatory potential of
prioritization on the basis of medical effectiveness. Although the -Oregon plan
was vilified on other grounds (principally that only poor people would be
asked to make sacrifices to help fund an expansion of health care coverage for
other poor people),43 virtually no public debate on disability rights had
occurred. As a result, the Bush administration's rejection of the plan because
of discrimination against patients with disabilities surprised most observers
39. See OREGON HEALTH SERVS. COMM'N, supra note 12, app. J (Prioritized Health Services List
of May 1, 1991) (ranking babies under 500 grams and 23 weeks gestation at #708, rather than #22).
Some economists have calculated that treatment of neonates under 1000 grams is less cost-effective than
treatment of larger newborns; however, both compared favorably to dialysis for end-stage renal failure.
Maynard, supra note 16, at 1540; Torrance, supra note 16, at 6 tbl. 1. The care of the smaller babies
cost $31,800 per QALY on average compared to $4500 per QALY for the larger babies. See also
Michael H. Boyle et al., Economic Evaluation of Neonatal Intensive Care of Very Low Birth Weight
Infants, 308 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1330, 1333 tbl. 4 (calculating $22,400 per QALY for babies 500 to 900
grams; $3200 per QALY for babies 1000 to 1499 grams) (expressing values in 1978 Canadian dollars).
40. Orentlicher, supra note 36, at 312.
41. This concern is discussed infra at notes 200-203 and accompanying text
42. Sullivan Letter, supra note 38, reprinted in 9 ISSUES L. & MED. at 410.
43. See, e.g., Alexander M. Capron, Oregon's Disability: Principles or Politics?, HASTINGS CTR.
REP., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 18, 19; Charles 3. Dougherty, Setting Health Care Priorities: Oregon's Next
Steps, HASTINGS CT. REP., May-June 1991, at Supp. 1; Michael J. Garland, Justice, Politics and
Community: Expanding Access and Rationing Health Services in Oregon, 20 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE
67, 69, 74-77 (1992); Hadom, Setting Health Care Priorities, supra note 15, at 2224; Paul T. Menzel,
Some Ethical Costs of Rationing, 20 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 57, 62 (1992); W. John Thomas, The
Oregon Medicaid Proposal: Ethical Paralysis, Tragic Democracy, and the Fate ofa Utilitarian Health
Care Program, 72 OR. L. REv. 47, 51-52, 127-28 (1993).
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and caused some speculation that the administration had simply used the
disability rights issue to derail a proposal which it found objectionable for
other reasons."
Disability rights issues had, however, percolated beneath the surface for
some time. According to one report, over twenty disability rights groups had
objected to the Oregon plan. 5 In fact, the National Legal Center for the
Medically Dependent & Disabled, Inc., a prominent pro-life litigation center,
wrote a crucial memo on December 5, 1991, in response to an inquiry by
Representative Christopher Smith (R-NJ) contending that the Oregon plan
violated the disability rights laws.4" Although the memo was written nearly
one year before the government announced its objections, much of its
reasoning was adopted in the government's ultimate response to the Oregon
application.
C. The Oregon Experiment
Oregon wanted to expand Medicaid eligibility to include all persons below
the poverty line. It hoped to keep the costs within manageable limits by
restricting the range of reimbursable services.
47
Oregon's initial ranking of treatments in May, 1990, was based on a pure
cost-effectiveness analysis, but problems with that list induced the Oregon
Health Services Commission to abandon that list and produce another one in
April, 1991, using a more intuitive, multifactorial methodology. Nonetheless,
considerations of effectiveness continued to play a crucial role, and their
inclusion ultimately caused the rejection of Oregon's initial request for
Medicaid waivers from the Federal Government.48
Effectiveness considerations entered the process at three junctures. First, the
Commission divided all treatments into one of seventeen different categories
and then ranked these categories. A sampling of the categories illustrates the
methodology: "acute fatal, treatment prevents death with full recovery"
(ranked #1); "maternity care" (#2); "acute fatal, treatment prevents death
without full recovery" (#3); "comfort care" (#7); "acute nonfatal, treatment
44. Paul T. Menzel, Oregon's Denial: Disabilities and Quality ofLife, HASTINGS CR. REP., Nov.-
Dec. 1992, at 21, 21, 25 n.13; Orentlicher, supra note 36, at 308.
45. Nancy K. Stade, Note, The Use of Quali,-of-Life Measures to Ration Health Care: Reviving
a Rejected Proposal, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1985, 2004 n.101 (1993). The broadest arguments claimed that
any rationing scheme at all would unlawfully discriminate "by reason of disability." Astrue, supra note
34, at 380; see also Menzel, supra note 44, at 25 n.13.
46. ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health Care Plan, reprinted in 9 IssuEs L. & MED. 397, 400
(1994) (Letter from Thomas J. Marzen, general counsel, and Daniel Avila, staff counsel, National Legal
Center for the Medically Dependent & Disabled, Inc., to Representative Christopher H. Smith (Dec. 5,
1991)) [hereinafter Marzen Letter].
47. Although other states had placed some broad limits on their Medicaid coverage, Oregon wanted
to make a more precise choice among treatments and conditions by considering both the effectiveness
of each treatment and public priorities. Jerrold J. Hercenberg & Wendy L. Krasner, Setting Priorities,
LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 16, 1992, at 20, 21.
48. Because Oregon's Medicaid coverage would differ from that required by federal law, Oregon
requested the waiver of several Medicaid requirements. Capron, supra note 43, at 18-19.
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causes return to previous health state" (#10); and "infertility services"
(#15)."9 These rankings gave priority to treatments which produced complete
cures over those which ordinarily produce only partial recovery. In this way,
the Commission retained a blunt measure of effectiveness in its ranking
process. The Commission also considered cost-effectiveness as one of many
factors used to create and rank these categories.50
Second, the Commission used QALYs to rank treatments within the
seventeen categories." Third and finally, the Commissioners reviewed the
resulting list and adjusted some of the rankings using their "professional
judgments and their interpretation of the community values."52 The Commis-
sioners imposed a "reasonableness" test upon themselves, taking into account
effectiveness and cost along with other factors such as public health impact,
incidence of condition, and social costs.53 The result was a ranking of 709
treatments of which 587 were to be funded in the first year. 54 This ranking
was submitted for Federal Government approval in August, 1991.
On August 3, 1992, the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS")
announced that Oregon had been denied a waiver because its plan violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").55 HHS objected to the use of
quality of life considerations to measure the effectiveness of a treatment.56
"[T]he premise that the value of the life of a person with a disability is less
than the value of the life of a person without a disability" was, it concluded,
49. OREGON HEALTH SERVS. COMM'N, supra note 12, app. G-l1 to G-12. Acute care was favored
over chronic care, fatal conditions over nonfatal, and complete cures over partial cures. Id. app. G-3 to
G-5. The Commission's goal in ranking these 17 categories was to use values expressed at community
meetings and public hearings. Id. at 15, 20.
50. Id. at 21.
51. Id. at 23. Benefits were measured using Dr. Robert M. Kaplan's Quality of Well-Being
("QWB") scale. Id. at 6-7, 23-27, apps. C, D; see also Kaplan & Anderson, supra note 12. Using the
results of a random telephone poll of 1001 Oregon households in which respondents were asked to rank
23 symptoms and 6 levels of functional impairment, the Commission assigned a value to various states
of health, such as requiring a wheelchair or having severe bums. OREGON HEALTH SERVS. COMIM'N,
supra note 12, at 26, app. C-l, C-5 to C-7; see also Garland, supra note 43, at 70 (describing the survey
methods); Stade, supra note 45, at 1989-91. The benefits associated with each treatment were then
calculated by using the values for the various outcomes provided by the telephone survey and weighting
those values to reflect the probability of their occurrence. OREGON HEALTH SERVS. COMM'N, supra note
12, app. D-3 to D-4. Expected outcomes were ascertained by polling practitioners. Id. at 10, app. D.
Outcomes (such as death or return to former health) were estimated five years after treatment. Id. app.
D-6. Net benefit (QWB) scores were derived by comparing the QWB score without treatment to the
QWB score with treatment. Id. app. D-3 to D-5. The Commission multiplied the expected QWB by the
duration of the benefit (thereby obtaining a measure of quality-adjusted life years or QALYs). Id. app.
D-3, D-13. In most cases, duration was the patient's life expectancy.
52. OREGON HEALTH SERvs. COMM'N, supra note 12, at 28.
53. Id. For example, preventable or readily treated conditions were moved from relatively
unfavorable positions. Id.
54. The legislature agreed to fund the top 587 treatments for 1991-1992 if federal approval for the
experiment was granted. See Garland, supra note 43, at 70.
55. Sullivan Letter, supra note 38, reprinted in 9 Issuas L. & MED. at 409. According to the
attorney who was then general counsel of HHS, Oregon's application was subjected to a new, stricter
standard of review. Astrue, supra note 34, at 378.
56. Sullivan Letter, supra note 38, reprinted in 9 IssuEs L. & MED. at 410. The government
objected to the role of quality of life considerations in the survey and in the Commission's final
adjustments to the list. Id.
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"inconsistent with the ADA. 5 7 Second, HHS contended that the survey used
to rank quality of life had used biased data that undervalued the quality of life
of disabled persons.5" This, too, violated the ADA. In addition, HI-IS
specifically identified two instances in which disabilities had been impermis-
sibly taken into account: (1) the ranking of alcoholic cirrhosis of the liver
(#690) below other cirrhoses (#366) and (2) the ranking of extremely low
birth weight babies (#708) below heavier babies (#22). 59
Oregon denied that it had violated the ADA, 60 but nevertheless complied
with HHS's demands. Approval was not granted until Oregon had eliminated
quality of life data from its formal methodology and had abandoned the
separate classification of alcoholic cirrhosis and low birth weight babies.
6
'
In addition, the newly-elected Clinton administration insisted that Oregon no
longer disfavor infertility treatments.6 2 In March, 1993, the Oregon Commis-
sion approved a new list which was based first on mortality and then, as a tie-
breaker, on cost considerations. It was then adjusted by the Commission to
reflect community values, such as a preference for preventive services and a
dislike for medically ineffective care.63 The plan took effect on February 1,
1994.64
This exchange between Oregon and the Federal Government has dramatic
implications for health policy. Oregon's capitulation has cast a shadow over
similar endeavors by other states. In its wake, considerable confusion exists
about the permissible role of effectiveness in allocating health resources.
Quality of life considerations had been rejected altogether and survival rates
had been permitted only after two categories which appeared to take disability
into account had been deleted (alcoholic cirrhosis and premature low birth
weight babies). Despite months of negotiations, Oregon remained unsure of
how effectiveness could be measured and extracted a promise from the
57. Id.
58. Id. The Oregon Report notes that persons with five specific impairments (thinking clearly,
trouble breathing, prescribed medication or diet, glasses, and trouble with sexual performance) did not
feel their impairments were as severe as those who had not experienced the problem. The Report notes
that "[t]his response has been replicated in a number of studies." OREGON HEALTH SERVS. COMM'N,
supra note 12, app. C-11.
59. Sullivan Letter, supra note 38, reprinted in 9 ISSUES L. & MED. at 411-12. The government also
contended that Oregon's treatment of low birth weight babies "would not be consistent with" the Child
Abuse Amendments of 1984. Id. at 412.
60. OREGON HEALTH SERVS. COMM'N, PRIORmzATION OF HEALTH SERVICES: A REPORT TO THE
GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 9 (1993).
61. On March 19, 1993, the government granted conditional approval to Oregon based on changes
that Oregon had agreed to make and on the condition of further changes outlined in the government's
response. ADA Analyses of the Oregon Health Care Plan, supra note 38, at 423 (Excerpt from HCFA's
Special Terms and Conditions Regarding the Oregon Plan Issued March 19, 1993).
62. Id. at 423.
63. OREGON HEALTH SERvS. COmm'N, supra note 60, at 16-18.
64. See Reform Focus: Oregon Health Plan, CCH PULSE: THE HEALTH CARE REFORM
NEWSLETrER, Feb. 21, 1994, at 10.
65. E.g., Hadorn, Setting Health Care Priorities, supra note 15, at 2221 (describing Colorado's
exploration of prioritization before the rejection of Oregon's plan); Hercenberg & Krasner, supra note
47, at 23. As of 1991, at least 18 states were considering similar proposals. Robinson, supra note 29,
at 978-79.
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Federal Government to seek a definition of effectiveness that would satisfy
the law.
66
Critics complained that the Federal Government had established an "almost
impossible standard" for states wishing to use effectiveness criteria to make
coverage decisions. 6 Some speculated that all efficiency-based rationing
schemes were doomed.6" "Indeed," wrote David Hadorn, "the 'D-word'
[discrimination] threatens to replace the 'R-word' (for rationing) as the most
feared epithet in the field of resource allocation."69 Alexander Morgan
Capron, another advocate of rationing, was equally dire in his assessment. "As
some form of rationing is an inevitable part of all health insurance," he
concluded, "the ADA roadblock to rational prioritization of services by their
expected benefit should be of grave concern to us all. 70
Was the Federal Government correct? Exactly what limits do the disability
rights laws place on the use of effectiveness criteria? Answering these
questions requires a basic understanding of the disability rights laws.
II. FEDERAL DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW
Two federal statutes protect disabled individuals from improper discrimina-
tion in health care decision-making: The Rehabilitation Act of 19737' and the
more recent Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). 72
A. The Basic Paradigm
Although the ADA is much more detailed than the Rehabilitation Act and
the wording of the various titles of the ADA are slightly different, the basic
paradigm of the two federal laws protecting disability rights can be briefly
summarized. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act bars discrimination by any
program receiving federal financial assistance or any executive agency against
an "otherwise qualified" individual 'vith a disability "by reason of her or his
disability." 3 The ADA extends this prohibition against discrimination "on
66. See also OREGON HEALTH SERVS. COMM'N, supra note 60, at 15.
67. Hercenberg & Krasner, supra note 47, at 22; see also A Bold Medical Plan, Derailed, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 6, 1992, at A22.
68. Thomas, supra note 43, at 139 (adopting that view and providing citations to newspaper
accounts expressing it); see also Capron, supra note 43, at 20. Thomas asserts that all rationing is
prohibited and calls the government's view "tantamount to a Rawlsian recognition of an absolute right
to health care." Thomas, supra note 43, at 140.
69. Hadorn, supra note 36, at 1454.
70. Capron, supra note 43, at 20.
71.29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Supp. V 1993). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, as amended, provides
as follows: "No otherwise qualified individual with a disability... shall, solely by reason of her or his
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance....
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (prohibiting discrimination "on the basis of' disability); see also 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.4(a) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination "on the basis of handicap").
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the basis of" disability to state programs and private entities that do not
receive federal funding.74
Federal law defines disabled persons as individuals who have a "physical
or mental impairment which substantially limits a major life activity," "who
have a record of such an impairment," or who are "regarded as having such
an impairment."' "5 The regulations list examples such as blindness, mental
retardation, emotional illness, cancer, heart disease, and HIV infection.76
The superficially distinct requirements that challenged conduct both disfavor
a "qualified" disabled applicant and also result in discrimination "on the basis
of' disability typically collapse into a single inquiry. As the U.S. Supreme
Court observed in Alexander v. Choate, "the question of who is 'otherwise
qualified' and what constitutes improper 'discrimination'. . . [are] two sides
of a single coin."" A person who lacks legitimate qualifications has not been
impermissibly discriminated against. Under both statutes, a person is
"qualified" to receive services such as health care if, with reasonable
modifications, she is able to meet a program's "essential" or "necessary"
eligibility requirements.7 s
Because disability often correlates with functional impairment and because
functional impairment may affect a person's qualifications for some
benefits,79 the laws governing disability rights permit consideration of a
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(14); Easley by Easley v. Snider, 841 F. Supp. 668, 672 (E.D. Pa.
1993), rev'd, 36 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 1994). The basic prohibition on disability-based discrimination is
phrased somewhat differently in the various titles of the ADA which are potentially relevant to health
care. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (barring discrimination in public services "by reason of' disability); id.
§ 12182(a) (barring discrimination in public accommodation "on the basis of disability"); id. § 12112(a)
(barring discrimination in employment "because of the disability').
75. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
76. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1994). David Orentlicher notes that this definition is so broad that it is
unlikely to be a serious hurdle for lawsuits over rationing. Orentlicher, supra note 36, at 309. Serious
medical conditions that are treated unfavorably are likely to constitute legal disabilities.
77. 469 U.S. 287, 299 n.19 (1985) (discussing the Court's interpretation of § 504 in Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)). The National Council on the Handicapped (which
initially proposed the Americans with Disabilities Act) also felt that the two requirements were
redundant and unnecessarily confusing. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD
INDEPENDENCE app. A-19 to A-20 (1986).
78. Although Section 504 itself does not state when a person is "otherwise qualified" to receive
services, the HHS regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act define the term to mean "a
handicapped person who meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of such services
45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(4) (1994) (applying to services other than employment or education). Under Title
II of the ADA, which regulates government services such as the Oregon Medicaid plan, a person who
is "qualified" to receive public services is someone who "meets the essential eligibility requirements"
for receipt of the services "with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices."
42 U.S.C. § 12131(2); see also Easley, 841 F. Supp. at 673. The Justice Department regulations
implementing Title II define essential eligibility requirements to be those "necessary for the provision
of the service." 28 C.F.IL § 35.130(b)(8) (1994). Title III, governing public accommodations, has no
explicit qualifications requirement but achieves the same result by permitting the use of "necessary"
eligibility criteria. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i); 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(a) (1994). Title I of the ADA,
which regulates employmint, also has a qualifications requirement, but it is somewhat different. See
infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
79. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES
144 (1983) ("The goal is neither to exaggerate and stereotype nor to ignore handicapped people's
functional limitations.").
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person's disability if the condition legitimately affects that person's ability to
meet the essential eligibility requirements.8" This basic structure is quite
different from civil rights legislation governing race because race is presumed
to be irrelevant."'
While acknowledging that disabilities are sometimes relevant, Congress als6
recognized that their consideration would often result in the exclusion of
disabled persons who could become qualified with modest modifications of
policies or practices. To prevent this, Congress required that a reasonable
effort be made to accommodate the needs of disabled persons before
concluding that they are ineligible.8 2 By conferring on people with disabili-
ties this right to affirmative assistance, Congress endorsed, at least in a
limited way, an egalitarian approach to distributive justice which allocates
extra resources for those persons with the greatest need. 3 As a result of the
80. See, e.g., Davis, 442 U.S. 397; United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 156 (2d Cir.
1984) (holding that consideration of disability is only improper when it "is unrelated to, and thus
improper to consideration of, the services in question").
81. See Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir. 1981); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 79, at 143; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, supra note 77, app. A-37
to A-38. The basic structure of the law governing disability rights is more like the treatment of gender,
national origin, and religion. With respect to those classifications, employers are permitted to make a
showing that discriminatory criteria are bona fide occupational qualifications necessary to the business.
Id. app. A-37 to A-38. When the civil rights laws were extended to disabled persons, it was widely
recognized that the presumption of irrelevancy would also be inappropriate here. See Davis, 442 U.S.
at 405; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 79, at 143-44; NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE
HANDICAPPED, supra note 77, app. A-37 to A-38.
82. Section 504 itself has no such requirement, but the HHS regulations implementing it expressly
require reasonable accommodations by employers. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1994) (regulating
employment); see also Davis, 442 U.S. at 407-13 (interpreting the education regulations); 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.44 (1994) (regulating accommodation in education). The ADA imposes a reasonable accommoda-
tion requirement as well. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (requiring public services to make "reasonable
modifications to rules, policies and practices'); id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (imposing a duty upon private
entities providing public accommodations to make "reasonable modifications" to policies, practices, and
procedures unless doing so would "fundamentally alter the nature of such ... services'); id. §§
12111(8)-(10), 12112(b)(5)(A), 12113(a) (imposing a duty on employers to make "reasonable
accommodation[s], including accessibility, job-restructuring, interpreters and equipment, unless doing
so would impose an "undue hardship," (i.e., a "significant difficulty or expense" under the circum-
stances)); 28 C.F.R. 35.130(b)(7) (1994) (excluding from the reasonable accommodation requirement
changes that would "fundamentally alter the nature of the service'); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (1994)
(stating that it is "unlawful" for an employer "not to make reasonable accommodation').
83. As federal district court Judge Devine poignantly observed, this provision charts a course
between the extremes of no assistance for overcoming disabilities (social Darwinism) and unlimited
assistance. Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 207 (D.N.H. 1981). Whether the reasonable
accommodation obligation is viewed as "equality plus" or "equality minus" depends upon one's
approach to distributive justice. Ifjustice imposes only an obligation not to discriminate against qualified
persons, then the obligation to make reasonable accommodations is an affirmative obligation that
exceeds the basic demands of distributive justice. See Wendy E. Parmet, Discrimination and Disability:
The Challenges ofthe ADA, 18 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 331, 336 (1990) (describing the ADA as an
entitlement program placed on the private sector); Peter M. Shane, Structure, Relationship, Ideology,
or, How Would We Know a "New Public Law" If We Saw It?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 837, 862 (1991)
(describing the ADA as "social welfare legislation" and not simply an "antidiscrimination" law).
However, ifjustice requires access on the basis of need, see BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 6,
at 272-73, then the limitations placed on the law's preference for those with the greatest need could be
viewed as something less than full distributive justice. Cf. Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual
Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987) (discussing the goal of making differences (e.g., gender)
"costless relative to each other').
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reasonable accommodation requirement, something more than a bare right to
equal access is conferred on people with disabilities. Instead, programs must
make reasonable efforts to accommodate their disabilities and enable them to
participate. Although reasonable accommodation is a general concept whose
application will typically depend upon the facts of a particular dispute, it does
not require "fundamental alteration" of, or an "undue burden" upon, the
program. 4
Finally, courts require an individualized assessment of each disabled
person's qualifications whenever possible. 5 Because disabilities vary in their
impact on functional ability, one major objective of the civil rights laws was
to replace stereotypical generalizations about classes of individuals with
decisions based upon individual qualifications.16 "Such an inquiry," observed
Justice Brennan, "is essential if § 504 is to achieve its goal of protecting
handicapped individuals from deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or
unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to ... legitimate concerns
.... ,,8' Nevertheless, courts tolerate broader classifications when substan-
tially all excluded persons are unqualified or when individualization is highly
impractical.88
Although civil rights laws are sometimes defended on utilitarian terms as well, the reasonable
accommodation requirement will not advance aggregate social welfare unless it is assumed that the
economic and noneconomic societal benefits of accommodating disabled individuals outweigh the costs
incurred. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIL RIGHTS, supra note 79, at 71-74. That assumption seems strained
in the context of access to relatively ineffective health care. At any rate, reliance on cost-benefit analysis
to evaluate government programs for disabled persons is controversial. Id. at 72-73.
84. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (regulating public accommodations);
Davis, 442 U.S. at 410; 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1994) (regulating public services). Employers have
a similar limit on their obligations. They need not make modifications which would impose an "undue
burden" under the circumstances. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8)-(10), 12112(b)(5)(A); see also 29 C.F.R.
§§ 1630.2(p), 1630.9(a) (1994).
85. E.g., School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987) (requiring assessment of the public health
risk posed by a teacher's tuberculosis before removing her from the classroom); Teahan v. Metro-North
Commuter RR., 951 F.2d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that an employer must show that past
alcohol abuse has some effect on current job performance to justify an employee's discharge), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 54 (1992); Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 231 n.7 (3d Cir. 1983)
(holding that individual examinations for hearing aid users applying for school bus driver's licenses do
not create an "undue burden"); Crane v. Dole, 617 F. Supp. 156 (D.D.C. 1985) (requiring an individual
assessment to determine whether hearing loss interferes with job performance); Garrity, 522 F. Supp.
at 213-18 (requiring individualization of care for institutionalized patients with mental illness); see also
Karen J. Merrikin & Thomas D. Overcast, Patient Selection for Heart Transplantation: When Is a
Discriminating Choice Discrimination?, 10 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 7, 18 & n.51 (1985) ("Categoric
exclusions of classes of handicapped individuals [from heart transplantation] might be considered
overbroad whenever they exclude persons who could benefit from treatment.').
86. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7); Arline, 480 U.S. at 287; Davis, 442 U.S. at 405 ("[M]ere
possession of a handicap is not a permissible ground for assuming an inability to function.'); 28 C.F.R.
pt. 35 app. A § 35.130, at 449 (1994) (stating that individualized evaluations are necessary to avoid
stereotypical assumptions).
87. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287.
88. The seminal case on individualization arose out of an age discrimination claim. In Western
Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, the Court adopted the "substantially all" and "highly impractical" tests. 472
U.S. 400, 414 (1985). No similarly definitive case has been decided in the context of disability rights.
See, e.g., Davis, 442 U.S. at 405 (permitting exclusion of hearing impaired students from a nursing
program); Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 175 Cal. Rptr. 548 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981) (requiring an employer to establish a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons
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To summarize this basic paradigm, a disabled person is qualified to receive
health benefits or services if, with reasonable accommodation, she is able to
meet the "essential" or "necessary" eligibility criteria. As a result, health care
rationing based on the relative effectiveness of different treatments will
survive challenge if, and only if, effectiveness is fairly characterized as a
'"necessary" or "essential" eligibility criterion (a characterization not yet
considered by the courts). Unfortunately, this legal test corresponds only
obliquely to the underlying ethical question: Under what circumstances should
medical utility trump a more egalitarian distribution of health benefits?
Nevertheless, it is by these terms that courts will measure health rationing
plans. Fortunately, the terms "necessary" and "essential" are sufficiently
elastic to permit judicial consideration of the important ethical issues.
Furthermore, even if maximization of health outcomes qualifies as a proper
eligibility requirement, courts are also likely to insist that the eligibility
determinations be as individualized as possible in order to avoid unfair
treatment caused by stereotypical assumptions of incapacity.
B. Essential/Necessary Eligibility Criteria
What does it mean for an eligibility criterion to be "necessary" or
"essential"? Most obviously, a challenged eligibility criterion must be
important to the goals and success of the program or guideline which employs
it, 9 but that may not be sufficient. The United States Supreme Court
suggested in Davis that discriminatory criteria must also be "legitimate"9
and "reasonable.""' The Court did not, however, explain exactly how much
additional scrutiny of program objectives it meant to endorse by these terms.
The same ambiguity limits the conclusions that can be drawn from other
federal court decisions commenting on the propriety of "reasonable" eligibility
requirements.92
with any back condition would be unable to perform the duties of a truck driver). Compare McCrea v.
Cunningham, 277 N.W.2d 52 (Neb. 1979) (upholding visual standard for firefighters) with Connecticut
Inst. for the Blind v. Connecticut Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 405 A.2d 618, 621
(Conn. 1978) (requiring an employer to show that ."no member of the class excluded is physically
capable of performing the tasks required by the job") (quoting Evening Sentinel v. National Org. for
Women, 357 A.2d 498, 501 (Conn. 1975)); see also BARBARA LiNDEMANN SCHLIE & PAUL GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DIscRIMINATION LAW 282-83 (2d ed. 1983); U.S. COMM'N ON CiviL RIGHTS, supra note
79, at 100-01, 118-22, 129-34 (advocating individualization as the only effective means of dealing with
overgeneralization about disabled persons, but acknowledging that the law varies with the particular
exclusion and context).
89. According to the legislative history of the ADA, a "necessary" eligibility requirement is one
whose prohibition would cause a "substantial interference with the operation" of the program. H.R. REP.
NO. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 58 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 512, 547. The
Department of Justice refused to be more specific in its regulations, explaining that the concept of
essential eligibility requirements applied in too many contexts for the agency to be more specific in its
regulations. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A § 35.130 at 451 (1994).
90. 442 U.S. at 406 (interpreting § 504); accord Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 (giving weight to "such
legitimate concerns" as public safety).
91. Davis, 442 U.S. at 414.
92. E.g., Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 907 F.2d 286,290-91 (2d Cir. 1990); Doe v. New York Univ.,
666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981).
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Nevertheless, Congress apparently intended to provide at least some scrutiny
of a defendant's objectives. According to the House Committee on Commerce
and Energy, "the prejudice or stereotypical views of other individuals cannot
be used as the basis for claiming a substantial interference with the operation
of a public accommodation."93 Consistent with that view, courts have
regularly ruled that the beliefs of co-employees or customers may not be used
as an excuse for discrimination.94 To hold otherwise would "give effect to
the prejudice of others."95 As a result, these justifications are insufficient
even if essential to the viability of the business.
Courts have not yet indicated whether they will extend their scrutiny of
purported justifications to those which are not so patently based on biased
attitudes. While several courts have rejected challenges to health benefit
programs in the past, none of the reported opinions has sanctioned the use of
either success rates or quality of life considerations.96 When the issue is
joined, as it was in Oregon, the statutory terms "essential" and "necessary"
seem sufficiently elastic to permit courts to consider whether medical utility
is a permissible basis for disfavoring disabled patients. In effect, courts would
be deciding whether the objective of maximizing health outcomes is an
"essential" program objective within the meaning of the equal opportunity
laws.
Courts and administrative agencies are especially likely to use this elasticity
to scrutinize the legitimacy of quality of life considerations. HHS did exactly
this in responding to the Oregon waiver request, as did a federal trial court
in the recent case of Baby K.97 In scrutinizing proffered justifications for
discriminatory classifications, judges will have to rely on the few hints
provided by the legislative history and the case law, supplemented by
93. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 89, at 58, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 547.
94. E.g., Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701, 711 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting a defense
based on the irrational fears of students and parents as insufficient to justify exclusion of teachers with
AIDS); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting a defense based
upon a customer preference for males); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th
Cir.) (rejecting a defense based on a customer preference for female flight attendants), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 950 (1971); Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 681 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (rejecting a defense based on
customer and co-worker preferences regarding AIDS); see also 28 C.F.R. pL 36, app. B § 36.301 at 602
(1994).
95. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (overturning a child custody order which removed
a child from her mother because she had subsequently married an African-American); accord City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (holding that protecting fhcility
residents from angry neighbors did not provide a rational basis for denying a zoning permit to a home
for the mentally disabled).
96. E.g., Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985);
Bernard B. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 679 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1982); Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3d
Cir. 1979); Duquette v. Dupuis, 582 F. Supp. 1365 (D.N.H. 1984); Doe v. Devine, 545 F. Supp. 576
(D.D.C. 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Their grounds for decision vary and are often
difficult to elucidate. Insurance underwriting and cost appear to be one defense. Several opinions also
appear to disfavor claims alleging discriminatory preferences for one disability over another. The EEOC
cites some of these same cases for the proposition that restrictions on broad categories of treatment (such
as mental health) do not constitute "disparate treatment" and therefore are not prohibited.
97. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), affid, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 91 (1994) (mem.).
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consideration of the ethical implications and analogies to other contexts.
These ingredients are the subject of Parts III and IV, which address the use
of success rates and quality of life measurements, respectively.
C. The Exemption for Insurance Underwriting
While the legal status of rationing based on effectiveness is still uncertain,
underwriting exclusions based on anticipated cost have express congressional
sanction. In the ADA, Congress authorized benefits plans to engage in "the
legitimate classification of risk.""8 As a result, plans remain free to consider
how various disabilities influence a person's risk of death or illness.99 This
exclusion permits risk-bearing health plans (but not necessarily practicing
physicians) to consider the anticipated cost of treating various disabilities.' 0
However, the statutory exemption for underwriting practices does not appear
to sanction the use of QALYs or other measures of a given treatment's
effectiveness. Unlike restrictions based on underwriting risks, eligibility
restrictions based on effectiveness are not based on the risk of subscriber
illness and its predicted cost. They are based, instead, on predicted outcomes.
Patients whose care is relatively ineffective are not necessarily any more
costly or financially risky than other patients. Their care does not present the
kind of cross-subsidization problems that standard underwriting practices are
98. The ADA permits "underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12201(c)(2); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(g), 794(d) (Supp. V 1993) (applying ADA standards to
determinations of employment discrimination per the 1992 Amendment); Bernard B., 528 F. Supp. at
132-33 (holding that an insurance company did not discriminate under § 504 in choosing to exclude
mental health benefits from a minimum coverage plan), aftd, 679 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1982).
The restrictions must not be a subterfuge and, unless the plan is self-insured, must comport with state
law. The exemption applies to any "organization covered" by the ADA which has a "bona fide benefit
plan." This very likely includes publicly-funded health plans which use underwriting calculations to
predict risks and shape coverage. The language in the ADA providing this exemption is commonly
referred to as "Section 501" of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
The exception for self-insured benefit plans includes no explicit requirement that the terms of the
benefit plan be actuarially based. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(3). As a result, it arguably permits discrimination
whether or not based on actuarial risk. DisTRicr OF COLUMBIA BAR TASK FORCE, supra note 9, at 54.
But the legislative history suggests a contrary intent. Id The EEOC has placed the same restrictions on
self-insured plans as on other plans. It uses the prohibition against subterfuge to accomplish this. EEOC,
INTERIM GuDANCE,'supra note 8, at 140,026.
99. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 70-71 (1990) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No.
458(111), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 493-94; H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
2, at 136-38 (1990) [hereinafter H.R. REP. NO. 485(1), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 419-21.
According to the legislative history, a plan based on defensible underwriting assumptions may refuse
to insure, limit the amount, extent, or kind of coverage, deny coverage for preexisting conditions, or
charge different premiums for the same coverage based on disability.
100. The Federal Government's correspondence with Oregon conceded that costs could be
considered. Sullivan Letter, supra note 38, reprinted in 9 ISSUES L. & MED. at 411. Nevertheless, the
exemption probably will not insulate the use of cost in settings which do not involve risk assessment,
such as the design and application of clinical practice guidelines by nonunderwriting entities. In those
circumstances, discriminatory criteria will have to be shown to be necessary or essential. See Orentlicher,
supra note 36, at 311. Risk-bearing physicians (e.g., those paid by capitation) might have a more
plausible claim to the underwriting exemption, depending upon the circumstances.
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meant to solve.' 0 ' As a result, only the cost portion of cost-effectiveness
analysis has clear statutory blessing, and even then only when it is part of an
underwriting process.
D. Dealing with the Multiplicity of Governing Legal Texts
The preceding Parts have outlined the basic paradigm of the disability rights
laws, but the structure of the anti-discrimination statutes themselves is
actually considerably more complex. Within the ADA, for example, separate
titles govern public services such as Oregon's Medicaid plan, employment
(including employer-sponsored health benefits plans), and public accommoda-
tions such as hospitals and physicians' offices. In addition, federal agencies
and federally-funded programs are subject to the Rehabilitation Act and its
regulations. Each of these statutes has its own relevant language describing
prohibited discrimination, thereby creating the possibility of diverse legal
standards for each activity. Fortunately, only the provisions governing
employer-sponsored health benefits present a serious prospect of different
requirements and, even then, courts are likely to sidestep the textual
differences. Although the title governing public accommodations also appears
to deviate from the basic paradigm, this appearance is misleading.
Public accommodations provided by private entities are regulated by Title
III of the ADA. 0 2 This title, which governs the practices of health insurers,
hospitals, and physicians, does not explicitly require that disabled persons be
"qualified" in order to receive statutory protection from discrimination. As a
result, it creates the misleading impression that all persons who need health
services must be given equal access to them without regard to disability.
Unfortunately, the trial court in Baby K was fooled by this difference in
text.103
In fact, Title III expressly permits the use of discriminatory eligibility
criteria if "necessary for the provision of the ... services ... being
offered.""' Discriminatory eligibility criteria are, therefore, permitted as
long as (and only if) they are "necessary." This is the same test set forth in
the ADA regulations to determine whether eligibility criteria employed by
government programs, such as Oregon's, are "essential."'0 5
The provisions in the ADA dealing with employer-provided health benefits,
on the other hand, deviate from this basic pattern. Although the ADA permits
employers to insist that applicants be qualified to perform their jobs, it does
not expressly authorize the imposition of separate eligibility requirements for
101. But see Orentlicher, supra note 36, at 310 (suggesting that inefficient use might constitute cross-
subsidization, but also noting the differences and calling the legal status "uncertain").
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189.
103. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1028-29 (E.D. Va. 1993), afftd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. (1994) (mem.).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (1994).
105. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (1994).
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employee fringe benefits.0 6 As a result, some doubt remains about the
propriety of imposing any eligibility requirements (other than underwriting
criteria) which have the effect of discriminating against disabled employees.
On the one hand, the idea of qualifications has less intuitive meaning when
applied to benefits such as sick leave, vacation, and health insurance than it
has when applied to the hiring decision. On the other hand, there is no reason
to believe that Congress intended to preclude the use of bona fide measures
of effectiveness to decide which treatments would be eligible for reimburse-
ment. Indeed, Congress probably never considered the issue. Neither is there
any reason to believe that Congress intended to impose more stringent
restrictions on employers than it imposed on other providers of health
insurance and health care, or that it meant to provide more protection to
disabled employees than it provided to other disabled consumers of health
services.
As a result, it is easy to understand why the EEOC has stretched the
exemption for underwriting practices to permit employers to defend exclu-
sionary restrictions on the grounds that they are "necessary ... to prevent the
occurrence of an unacceptable change either in the coverage of the health
insurance plan, or in the premiums charged for the health insurance plan.'" 7
Under this interpretation of the ADA, QALYs could potentially be defended
as necessary to prevent either greatly increased premiums or unacceptable
reductions in coverage." ° In effect, this interpretation allows employer-
sponsored plans the defense that restrictions on relatively ineffective care are
essential to prevent a fundamental alteration of the program and a substitution
of less desirable mechanisms for controlling costs. This closely resembles the
inquiry which would be undertaken to determine the necessity of discrimina-
tory eligibility criteria in nonemployment contexts. Courts, like the EEOC, are
likely to find a way to permit the use of essential eligibility criteria for
employee fringe benefits. They could accomplish this either by interpreting
expansively the exemption for underwriting practices, or by concluding that
discrimination based on legitimate eligibility requirements is not discrimina-
tion "by reason" of disability. As the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged years
106. In the context of employment, a "qualified handicapped person" under § 504 is someone "who,
with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1)
(1994). The employment provisions of the ADA state that a "qualified individual with a disability" is
an individual who can "perform the essential functions of the employment position" with or without
reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Eligibility criteria that screen out disabled persons
must be '"job-related ... and.., consistent with business necessity." Id. §§ 12112(b)(6), 12113(a).
107. EEOC, INTERIM GuIDANcE, supra note 8, at 140,027.
108. The EEOC has defined an "unacceptable" change in coverage or premiums to be one which
would
1) make the health insurance plan effectively unavailable to a significant number of other
employees, 2) make the health insurance plan so unattractive as to result in significant adverse
selection, or 3) make the health insurance plan so unattractive that the employer cannot
compete in recruiting and maintaining qualified workers due to the superiority of health
insurance plans offered by other employers in the community.
Id. (footnote omitted). This definition may be more narrow in practice than a more general authorization
to use criteria which are "essential" or "necessary" to the integrity of the benefits plan. However, the
EEOC explicitly states that its list of justifications is not exclusive. Id. at 140,026.
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ago, exclusions based on the absence of legitimate qualifications are not the
kind of discrimination that Congress meant to prohibit. 9
Until the courts rule on this issue, it is possible, but unlikely, that
employers will be flatly prohibited from adopting health benefits plans that
discriminate on the basis of disability for nonunderwriting reasons. Courts are
more likely to evaluate noncost justifications by applying the same test used
in nonemployment contexts: the challenged eligibility criteria must be
essential or necessary.
III. "NEUTRAL" MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS: SURVIVAL RATES
The Federal Government's initial rejection of the Oregon rationing plan
highlighted the fiercely divisive issues raised by the use of quality of life
considerations. In truth, however, the use of any measure of effectiveness, no
matter how superficially "neutral" or "objective," will also raise basic
questions about the choice between allocative efficiency and distributive
justice in health care. Even if quality of life considerations were removed
entirely from the calculus and some other measure of treatment effectiveness
such as survival rates were used, rationing based on effectiveness could still
disfavor patients with disabilities that are resistant to treatment or which make
it more difficult to treat other diseases. This Part examines the conflict
between the efficiency and egalitarian perspectives which arises when survival
rates-a relatively noncontroversial measure of effectiveness-are uti-
lized." ° Part IV will consider the additional issues raised when quality of
life is considered.
A. The Underlying Conflict Between Utility and Equality
QALYs seek to maximize health outcomes by eliminating the least effective
treatments. David Hadorn reasons that disabled persons who are likely to have
relatively poor outcomes from a medical procedure (such as heart transplant
candidates who are diabetic) may be excluded from coverage on the ground
that they are not qualified to receive it."' He suggests that the objective
109. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299 n.19 (1985).
110. For example, measuring effectiveness on the basis of the duration of benefit raises special issues
of both disability and age-based discrimination. Because this criterion, like quality of life measurements,
may raise additional issues, my discussion of success rates is not intended to suggest that identical
conclusions would be reached regarding the use of duration as a measure of treatment effectiveness.
111. Hadom, supra note 36, at 1457. Hadorn is careful to require that any restrictions be based on
sound scientific criteria. Id. at 1458.
Supporters of the Oregon plan also believed that Oregon had not discriminated on the basis of
disability because the State had offered the same package of benefits to both disabled and nondisabled
patients. Hercenberg & Krasner, supra note 47, at 22; Thomas, supra note 43, at 138 (citing a telephone
interview with Paige R. Sipes-Metzler, Executive Director, Oregon Health Services Commission (Aug.
5, 1992)). From this perspective, the treatment of all patients was "even-handed" and, thus,
nondiscriminatory. As should be apparent, however, plans like these are hardly even-handed. In each,
the substantive coverage terms are themselves discriminatory. In each, disabled patients would be treated
less favorably than others because of their disabilities. As the Supreme Court stated in Alexander, "The
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application of scientifically sound outcomes data would support the exclusion
of patients whose outcomes are relatively nonbeneficial or unsatisfactory.' 2
Hadorn also apparently assumes that criteria intended to maximize outcomes
would meet the legal requirement of being "essential" or "necessary" for
provision of the service. Karen Merrikin and Thomas Overcast considered this
issue directly in their analysis of disability-based exclusions from heart
transplantation programs and reached the same conclusion." 3 These views,
which are shared by many, if not most commentators, reflect the assumption
that society can and should consider the effectiveness of a medical treat-
ment. "1
4
Ethicist Robert Veatch and others argue, however, that not all care that is
cost-ineffective is morally expendable." s Formal justice requires that like
cases be treated alike." 6 From an egalitarian perspective, a strong argument
can be made that effectiveness does not qualify as a morally relevant basis for
treating one patient differently from another. That a patient's odds are lower
because of his disability in no way reflects that patient's virtue, merit, worth,
or any other similarly relevant basis for treating people differently."7 John
Harris views QALYs as part of a philosophy "in which the good guys are the
fortunate for whom long and healthy life-expectancy can be cheaply provided"
and the enemies are "those unfortunates who stand between the fortunate and
their survival by daring to make rival claims.""' From this egalitarian
perspective, treating like cases alike means treating equally needy patients as
benefit itself, of course, cannot be defined in a way that effectively denies otherwise qualified
handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled." Alexander, 469 U.S. at 301;
see also NATIONAL COUNCiL ON THE HANDICAPPED, supra note 77, app. A-20 to A-22 (noting that if
discriminatory criteria make a person unqualified, disabled persons could be eliminated from
participation); Stade, supra note 45, at 2008-09 (rejecting the defense).
112. Hadom, supra note 36, at 1457.
113. Merrikin & Overcast, supra note 85, at 15-18. Merrikin & Overcast conclude that disabled
candidates may be excluded if they are "unable to benefit" or have "[no] reasonable chance of a
successful clinical outcome." Id. at 18.
114. E.g., BEAUCHAMI & CHILDRESS, supra note 6, at 294-301; LARRY R. CHURIciLL, RATIONING
HEALTH CARE IN AMRIucA 95, 121-25 (1987); Menzel, supra note 43, at 57; Orentlicher, supra note
36, at 311-12 (endorsing likelihood, duration, and degree of benefit); Steven A. Toms, Outcome
Predictors in the Early Withdrawal of Life Support: Issues of Justice and Allocation for the Severely
Brain Injured, 4 J. CLIN. ETHICS 206, 210 (1993).
115. E.g., ROBERT M. VEATCH, THE FOUNDATIONS OF JUSTICE 149-52 (1986); Jerry Avom, Benefit
and Cost Analysis in Geriatric Care: Turning Age Discrimination into Health Policy, 310 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1294 (1984); John Harris, QALYfying the Value of Life, 13 J. MED. ETHICS 117, 120, 122
(1987) [hereinafter Harris, QALYfytng the Value ofLife] (arguing that life expectancy is irrelevant); John
Harris, Unprincipled QALYs: A Response to Cubbon, 17 J. MED. ETHICS 185 (1991) [hereinafter Harris,
Unprincipled QALYs] (objecting to both life expectancy and quality of life considerations); Robert M.
Veatch & Carol M. Spicer, Medically Futile Care: The Role of the Physician in Setting Limits, 18 AM.
J.L. & MED. 15, 29 (1992); see also Brock, supra note 28, at 93 (describing the arguments for an equal
chance or lottery to ration scarce organs).
116. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 6, at 259; VEATCH, supra note 115, at 6;
Daniel Wilder, Philosophical Perspectives on Access to Health Care: An Introduction, in 2 SECURING
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, supra note 20, at 109, 114 (stating that equal access should be preferred
absent morally relevant differences).
117. Harris, QALYying the Value ofLife, supra note 115, at 121.
118. Harris, Unprincipled QALYs, supra note 115, at 187.
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equally qualified and giving them equal access to treatment." 9 Indeed, in
Veatch's view, it may require especially favorable treatment of persons with
disabilities in order to give them "an opportunity for equality of well-being
over a lifetime."'"2 That a person's disability deprives her of equal odds is
tragic enough, without compounding that misfortune by denying her equal
access to potentially beneficial medical care.
The egalitarian view is also consistent with the "differences" principle of
John Rawls. In a just society, according to Rawls, "[a]ll social values-liberty
and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect-are to be
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these
values is to everyone's advantage.'' Because rationing on the basis of
effectiveness will disadvantage individuals with short life expectancies or with
diseases that are especially difficult to cure, the differences principle seems
to imply that this unequal expenditure of resources would be unjust.
These two opposing views stake out the legal and ethical battleground on
which health care allocation schemes must be judged. Hadorn's view assumes
that scientifically-supported effectiveness criteria are sufficient to defend a
plan. Although his endorsement of these criteria has the appearance of
neutrality,' in truth it endorses a very utilitarian brand of distributive
justice in which allocative efficiency is more important than equal access."
This tension is illustrated in Beauchamp and Childress' classic treatise on
bioethics. The text first endorses a "fair opportunity" principle requiring equal
distribution of social benefits unless the differences are ones for which the
affected persons are responsible. Yet, it later accepts as an "unargued
premise" that it is "morally imperative" to take medical utility into account
in an effort to "save as many lives as possible through the available
resources."' 24 The noted British health economist Alan Williams correctly
notes that "[a]t the end of the day we simply have to stand up and be counted
as to which set of principles we wish to have underpin the way the health care
system works." '125
119. VEATCH, supra note 115, at 149 (arguing that justice means giving disabled patients "an equal
shot at a desired outcome"); see also Orentlicher, supra note 36, at 311 (acknowledging that a
reasonable argument could be made under the disability rights laws that all patients who could benefit
are qualified).
120. VEATCH, supra note 115, at 149; see also Alwyn Smith, Qualms About QALYs, THE LANCET,
May 16, 1987, at 1134, 1135 (pointing out that several nonutilitarian strategies would favor patients who
have the greatest need).
121. JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 61-62 (1971). Others have referred to it as a "maximin"
principle. Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinallst-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls' Theory ofJustice, 70 J. PHIL.
245, 248 (1973).
122. See Hercenberg & Krasner, supra note 47, at 22 (referring to the Oregon practice as neutral on
its face); see also Hadom, supra note 36, at 1458 (referring to the "objective application of outcome
data').
123. Failure to appreciate this underlying value choice would risk conflation of efficiency with
equality. See Brock, supra note 28, at 88 (arguing that medical criteria are not value-neutral); La Puma,
supra note 11, at 437 (viewing QALYs as part of a larger societal evolution toward a utilitarian ethic);
Smith, supra note 120, at 1136 (arguing that QALYs couch a political issue as a technical one).
124. BEAUCHAmp & CHILDRESS, supra note 6, at 270-72, 296-97.
125. Alan Williams, Response: QALYying the Value of Life, 13 J. MED. ETHICS 117, 123 (1987).
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B. The Legal and Ethical Sufficiency of Success Rates
Congress did not provide specific guidance regarding this choice between
medical utility and equal access, but it did provide a structure through which
courts can analyze the choice. As discussed above, eligibility criteria based
on effectiveness must be examined to determine if they are genuinely
"necessary" or "essential" to the program.'26 At a minimum, this means that
effectiveness criteria must be shown to have demonstrable importance to the
program's goal of maximizing health outcomes from limited resources. The
harder question is whether this objective is itelf "essential" or whether, like
satisfaction of customer preferences, it is legally and ethically insufficient to
justify discriminatory conduct.
1. Importance for Plan Objectives
Although the rationing of rarely-effective care is not the only way to ration
beneficial care, none of the alternatives (such as first-come-first-served
service, cost-based exclusions, higher patient co-payments, and lower annual
limits on coverage) have similar promise for maximizing health care
outcomes. For example, if cost alone were used to rank treatments, expensive
procedures which are very successful would be disfavored and inexpensive
procedures which are rarely successful would be favored. Uniform spending
limits would deny coverage to persons with conditions which are expensive
or lengthy to treat even if the treatments are ultimately very effective.
Similarly, annual or lifetime caps would subsidize the care of persons whose
treatments are less expensive but less effective. Broad categorical exclusions,
like noncoverage of mental or dental health, are another common alternative
that is less likely to result in facial violation of the disability laws, but would
deny effective care to many, while funding comparatively ineffective care to
patients whose treatments are covered. In short, none of these alternatives
seek to squeeze the most health benefits possible from finite resources. 2
A prohibition on disability-based rankings would reduce the ability of a
health plan to accomplish its allocative objectives. Indeed, the utility of
effectiveness criteria would be destroyed if plans were forbidden to favor
some disabilities while disfavoring others.'28 Making distinctions of this
kind is the very purpose of using QALYs. A prohibition on comorbidity
considerations would also impair the goal of maximizing health outcomes,
though not as dramatically. Its impact would vary with each health plan or
126. See supra part II.B.
127. As a result, none of the alternatives would provide a benefit to patients "in the manner targeted"
by the program. Easley by Easley v. Snider, 841 F. Supp. 668, 675 (E.D. Pa. 1993), rev'd, 36 F.3d 297
(3d Cir. 1994). Ironically, each of the alternatives (except random assignments such as lotteries) retains
the potential to disfavor disabled patients in practice. That is because the care of disabled persons will
often be more expensive than the norm and because broad exclusions, like that of mental health, are
often closely related to a large category of disabled persons.
128. Many of the conditions whose treatment would be ranked in a system like Oregon's would
constitute legal disabilities. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
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practice guideline, depending upon the availability and use of data regarding
disability-related comorbidity. Although a prohibition on comorbidity
classifications would not have been a fatal blow for Oregon's plan, Oregon
was criticized for not taking greater account of comorbidity.'2 9 As outcomes
data improve, both health plans and practice guidelines are likely to make
greater use of comorbidity data.
In short, the use of effectiveness criteria is vital to the goal of maximizing
health outcomes from fixed resources. Although the practical significance of
a bar on effectiveness-based classifications that disfavor persons with
disabilities will depend upon the facts of the particular practice being
challenged, it seems safe to assume that the negative impact will often be
substantial.
It is tempting to suggest, however, that no rationing of beneficial care can
be characterized as necessary or essential until additional efforts have been
made to eliminate waste and to increase resources. 30 Obviously, a greater
effort to husband resources is vital, but consideration of effectiveness is one
way to stimulate efficiency.' 3 1 Furthermore, the reality is that the resources
available for health care are finite, rationing already exists, and its continua-
tion, in one form or another, is inevitable. While efforts to increase resources
and improve efficiency are urgently needed, they will not eliminate the need
to make choices about whom and what services to cover.
Rationing is already a stable component of American health care. The
American health care system rations on the basis of wealth and access to
health insurance. 32 Eligibility for insurance is the principal mechanism used
to decide who receives care, 33 but our system also rations through caps on
total coverage, limited coverage of disfavored conditions such as AIDS or
mental illness, and exclusion of care that is "experimental" or not medically
indicated. Care is rationed in overcrowded intensive care units and undersup-
plied organ transplantation programs.' 34 It is rationed when decisions are
made about who receives a second opinion, a high-tech CT scan for head
pain, or a referral to a specialist. 35 The Federal Government promotes the
rationing of care when it pays hospitals a lump sum for each patient with a
particular diagnosis, leaving it up to the providers to decide how aggressively
129. Capron, supra note 43, at 20.
130. E.g., Marcia Angell, The Doctor as Double Agent, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 279,284 (1993);
Harris, QALYfying the Value of Life, supra note 115, at 122; Arnold S. Relman, The Trouble with
Rationing, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 911, 912 (1990).
131. Eddy, supra note 24, at 420 (noting the limits of the state's power to eliminate waste and
inefficiency).
132. E.g., CHURCHILL, supra note 114, at 14; Eddy, supra note 23, at 106; Leonard M. Fleck, 4 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 362, 363 (1993) (reviewing MARTIN STROSBERG ET AL., RATIONING AMERICA'S
MEDICAL CARE: THE OREGON PLAN AND BEYOND (1992)).
133. See, e.g., Eddy, supra note 33, at 2443 (noting that 40% of the poor are ineligible for
Medicaid).
134. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 6, at 297; Tristram Engelhardt & Michael A. Rie,
Intensive Care Units, Scarce Resources and Conflicting Principles of Justice, 255 JAMA 1159, 1162
(1986) (proposing that ICU admissions be made on the basis of likelihood of success, quantity of
success, and length of survival).
135. See Paul T. Menzel, Double Agency and the Ethics of Rationing Health Care: A Response to
Marcia Angell, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 287, 289 (1993); Beck, supra note 1, at 30.
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each patient is to be treated. 3 6 Americans have never been willing to pay
for all the health care that is of any conceivable benefit, nor are they likely
to do so in the future. Unfortunately, these existing mechanisms for deciding
who receives what care are blunt and often irrational or unfair, reflecting the
influence of wealth, employment, habit, cost, and power.
Current attempts to reduce wealth-based rationing are long overdue. But
even the Clinton administration has conceded that its efforts to increase access
and security must be followed by reconsideration of funding for the least
effective care."' Indeed, the funding requirements of comprehensive health
care for all Americans will make efforts to control costs and husband
resources even more vital. While calls to simplify administration and to end
fraud, waste, and price-gouging are warranted and may yield some savings
(perhaps significant savings), the unending capacity to generate marginally
more effective health care procedures at vastly greater expense will preclude
exclusive reliance upon such simple and ethically appealing methods of cost
control.'3 8 Given the urgent need for resources in other societal contexts such
as housing, education, research and development, crime control, and
environmental regulation, difficult choices about health care coverage are
unlikely to be avoided in the foreseeable future. 139 Americans will rightly
want to insure that they get value for their health care expenditures. While
cost-savings may buy time to debate the mix of rationing methods, it will not
eliminate the excruciatingly painful decisions about how much health care is
enough and which health care to exclude.
In fact, the Clinton administration's Health Care Reform Task Force
assumed as much. To facilitate its deliberations over suitable mechanisms for
resolving disputes about coverage, the Bioethics Working Group considered
three treatments which might become the subject of dispute. 40 One was
cystic fibrosis testing for pregnant women, which costs approximately two
hundred dollars and is not as accurate as amniocentesis, the test for Down's
Syndrome. The second was Tachrine, a newly approved drug used to
ameliorate the cognitive deficits produced by Alzheimer's Disease. Tachrine
136. Leonard M. Fleck, DRGs: Justice and the Invisible Rationing of Health Care Resources, 12 J.
MED. & PHIL. 165, 185 (1987); Fleck, supra note 24, at 1609-10.
137. See Grimes, supra note 1, at 5C.
138. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOIHRD-92-120, HOSPITAL COSTS: ADOPTION
OF TECHNOLOGIES DRivEs COST GROWTH 4 (1992) (noting that despite the initiation of Medicare's
prospective payment system, costs grew, and the single most important factor was the rapid adoption
of new technology).
139. E.g., Daniel Callahan, Rationing Health Care: Will It Be Necessary? Can It Be Done Without
Age or Disability Discrimination?, 5 ISSUES L. & MED. 353, 362 (1989); Capron, supra note 43, at 20;
Fleck, supra note 132, at 363-64; Menzel, supra note 135, at 288; Orentlicher, supra note 36, at 308;
Thomas, supra note 43, at 115-16; Robert M. Veatch, Justice and Outcomes Research: The Ethical
Limits, 4 J. CLINICAL ETHiCs 258 (1993); Robert J. Samuelson, Health Care: How We Got Into This
Mess, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 4, 1993, at 31, 35. Contra Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Rationing Health Care: The
Unnecessary Solution, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1525, 1526-27 (1992).
140. Nancy N. Dubler, Working on the Clinton Administration's Health Care Reform Task Force,
3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 421, 428-29 (1993). Ms. Dubler was co-chair of the Bioethics Working
Group. Her article provides the factual basis for my summaries of the three treatments.
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is expensive, has little clinical effect, and may be harmful to some users.14 1
Finally, autologous bone marrow transplantation for end-stage metastatic
cancer is rarely effective and extraordinarily expensive. Yet, it is under-
standably requested as a treatment of last resort. The Bioethics Working
Group recognized that these scenarios were representative of a much larger
pool of potential conflicts, including expenditures in neonatal intensive care
units and on terminal care for the elderly. 42 Rationing these different
medical treatments involves difficult decisions which will have to be faced in
the near future. Plans which seek to maximize returns from scarce resources
will need to consider the relative effectiveness of each treatment.
2. Legitimacy of Plan Objectives
Should maximizing outcomes be viewed as a legitimate justification for
discriminating on the basis of disability? 43 Passages from the legislative
history suggest an egalitarian interpretation of the law, but their persuasive
power is limited by their ambiguity and by the failure of Congress to voice
any objection to the contemporaneous use of success rates in the administra-
tion of federal health care programs. These limitations leave judges with
considerable freedom to implement their own views of desirable public policy.
Although a few cases seem to support the egalitarian view, they are
inadequately analyzed, distinguishable, and opposed by other judicial
decisions. Rather than rely on these prior cases, future opinions are likely to
address the substantive issue directly. Courts will very likely resolve the issue
by comparing survival rates to the only other prohibited criterion (customer
or co-worker preferences) and conclude that the use of survival rates is
permissible because, unlike customer preferences, the use of survival rates
will not give effect to invidious stereotypes. This result is good policy as well
as good law.
a. Legislative History
Significant support for an egalitarian interpretation of the ADA appears in
the House Judiciary Committee report. In its discussion of employee health
insurance, the Committee specifically stated that any limit on insured
procedures (such as a limit on dialysis) must apply to all patients, with or
without disabilities. "Persons with disabilities," according to the report, "must
have equal access to the health insurance coverage that is provided by the
141. Tachrine reportedly relieves memory loss slightly for one-fifth of its users, but widespread use
by the approximately four million sufferers of Alzheimer's would exceed $500 million annually to
benefit only 80,000 persons. Samuelson, supra note 139, at 35.
142. Dubler, supra note 140, at 430.
143. The terms "necessary" and "essential" are very broad and are consistent with a requirement that
exclusionary eligibility criteria select beneficiaries on a morally relevant basis. See supra part 11.B.
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employer to all employees."'" Thus, persons with kidney disease should not
be denied coverage for treatments such as heart surgery if those treatments are
offered to employees who are not disabled.'45 This passage raises serious
questions about the propriety of any coverage limitation or practice guideline
which considers disability-based comorbidity.
Other passages in the legislative history suggest that differences in treatment
effectiveness would not constitute a sufficient justification for disability-based
discrimination. The Judiciary Committee report states that disabled persons
are entitled to an "equal opportunity to obtain the same results as others."'46
In addition, the report of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
while conceding that equal opportunity does not require equal results,
emphasizes that "individuals with disabilities must be afforded an equal
opportunity to attain substantially the same result." 47
To illustrate conduct that violates the right of equal opportunity, the report
of the Judiciary Committee describes the exclusion of persons using
wheelchairs from an exercise class: "[A]n exercise class cannot exclude a
person who uses a wheelchair because he or she cannot do all of the exercises
and derive the same result from the class as persons without a disability.'
If a person in a wheelchair cannot be excluded from exercise class because
she will derive fewer benefits than others in the class, then perhaps a disabled
patient should not be excluded from treatment simply because she is less
likely to derive a benefit from it. The analogy to comorbidity classifications
is especially close. Those classifications, like the discrimination in the
exercise class, deny a benefit to a disabled person which is offered to other
individuals who lack the disability.
As a result, the legislative history provides some credible support for the
view that discrimination on the basis of criteria such as success rates ought
not be considered essential or necessary, at least in the context of comor-
bidity. It is relatively uninformative, however, about the propriety of treating
one disability more favorably than others. Even with respect to comorbidity,
the dispositive power of this legislative history is reduced by the absence of
any indication that Congress directly considered the difficult issues posed
when health care resources are allocated.
144. H.R. REP. No. 485(111), supra note 99, at 38, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 461; see also
H.R. REP. No. 485(HI), supra note 99, at 59, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 341.
145. H.R. REP. No. 485(III), supra note 99, at 38, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 460-61. The
EEOC statements have used more ambiguous language, requiring that all employees be provided with
"'equal access' to whatever health insurance the employer provides to employees without disabilities."
EEOC, INTERIM GUnnANcE, supra note 8, at 140,023.
146. H.R. REP. No. 485(I1), supra note 99, at 55, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 478.
147. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 57 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
512, 546.
148. H.R. REP. No. 485(m, supra note 99, at 55, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 478. Although
this illustration appears in a part of the report discussing public accommodations, the legislative history
leaves no doubt that the general prohibitions contained in Title IH (governing public services) were
meant to incorporate the specific prohibitions of Title Ill (governing public accommodations). Id. at 51
("Title II should be read to incorporate provisions of Titles I and III which are not inconsistent with the
regulations implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ....").
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Consider, for example, the exercise class. It seems reasonable to suppose
that Congress would want to take a fresh look at this example if the exercise
class were part of a health program for people with heart disease and the costs
were not paid by the participant directly, but instead were paid by a health
plan. Now assume that the class were oversubscribed and the health plan
limited enrollment in the class to those most likely to benefit from the class
and, for that reason, excluded patients with some severe disabilities. Congress'
intentions regarding the allocation of scarce health resources in this situation
cannot be confidently deduced from its sentiments about an ordinary exercise
class with no apparent space or resource limits at stake.
Similar ambiguity limits the conclusions which can be drawn from the
Judiciary Committee's statement, described above, 14 9 that any limit on
insured procedures must apply equally to all patients without regard to
disability. It is unclear whether Congress meant to indicate that differential
coverage could never be justified by any eligibility criteria or whether it
simply assumed that no such justification ordinarily existed. The latter
explanation is more plausible. The Committee staff must have assumed, for
example, that no actuarial basis for the differential treatment existed.
Otherwise, the language in this report would be inconsistent with Congress'
explicit sanction of discrimination based on actuarial calculations. The staff
may similarly have assumed that no other "necessary" or "essential" eligibility
requirement could explain the discrimination. If this reading of the legislative
history is correct, then it provides no guidance regarding the sufficiency of
survival rates as a basis for differential treatment.1
5 0
Furthermore, Congress would surely have indicated more clearly if it
intended to bar altogether the long-standing clinical practice of taking
comorbidity into account. The legislative history indicates no objection to the
contemporaneous use of effectiveness considerations in federal health
programs. For example, the Health Care Finance Administration ("HCFA")
had previously approved criteria for selecting heart transplant recipients that
take into account comorbidities which reduce the recipients' odds of
success.' 5 ' HCFA concluded that selection of these recipients would "waste"
scarce resources. 52 Courts will correctly be reluctant to read into the
legislative history an intention to prohibit these practices. Perhaps for this
reason, the Bush administration's objection to Oregon's unfavorable treatment
of alcoholic cirrhosis was based on the absence of a "medical underpinning"
149. See supra text accompanying notes 146-47.
150. In addition, this discussion occurred in the context of employment benefit discrimination. See
supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text. Congress never explicitly authorized employers to impose
any eligibility criteria upon fringe benefits except those based on underwriting experience. As a result,
the shadow which this legislative history casts on the use of comorbidity classifications may extend only
to employer-provided health insurance.
151. Medicare Program; Criteria for Medicare Coverage of Heart Transplants, 52 Fed. Reg. 10935,
at 10,949 (1987) [hereinafter Medicare Program]; Douglas L Besharov & Jessica D. Silver, Rationing
Access to Advanced Medical Techniques, 8 J. LEG. MED. 507, 516 (1987).
152. Medicare Program, supra note 151, at 10,940.
[Vol. 70:491
HeinOnline  -- 70 Ind. L.J. 522 1994-1995
HEALTH CARE RATIONING
for Oregon's action."5 3 In its place, the administration suggested an
approach similar to the one used by Medicare, which requires evidence of
sufficient social support of the patient in order to assure assistance in alcohol
rehabili-tation and, thus, increased odds of success. 54 The government's
response to Oregon also appeared to leave room for Oregon to justify its low
ranking for babies born after less than twenty-three weeks gestation and
weighing less than 500 grams on the basis of their low survival rates.155
Obviously, the Executive Branch concluded that Congress did not mean to
preclude distinctions based on success rates. 56
To summarize, the legislative history provides credibility to the egalitarian
view, at least in the context of comorbidity classifications, but does not
dictate its adoption.
b. The "Capacity to Benefit" Cases
Some federal court opinions also appear to provide support for an
egalitarian interpretation of disability rights laws, but the strength of that
support diminishes greatly on close reading. In its important report on
disability rights, the United States Commission on Civil Rights noted several
cases which appear to determine a person's qualifications for education or
housing by asking whether the applicant is "'capable of benefitting"' from the
program. 15' Health care is an especially appealing context for using a
"capacity to benefit" test because, unlike higher education or employment,
health care is not allocated on the basis of ability or just deserts. ' s It seems
strained to argue that a patient whose disease is especially difficult to treat
153. Sullivan Letter, supra note 38, reprinted in 9 ISSUES L & MED. at 411.
154. Id. at 412 (citing Medicare Program; Criteria for Medicare Coverage of Adult Liver Transplants,
56 Fed. Reg. 15,006 (1991)).
155. One legal scholar believes that HHS's objections to Oregon's treatment of babies reflects
opposition to effectiveness criteria. Thomas, supra note 43, at 137. But the Federal Government's
objections to this category in the original Oregon plan appear to have been based on suspicions about
Oregon's use of quality of life measurements.
156. Arguably, the Clinton administration's approval of a revised Oregon plan which relied heavily
on survival rates to rank treatment supports this position as well. See OREGON HEALTH SERVS. COMM'N,
supra note 60, at 10-12. But the revised Oregon plan had deleted its apparent comorbidity classifica-
tions. As a result, the Federal Government's approval provides no insight into its beliefs about the use
of comorbidity classifications based on survival rates.
157. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 79, at 115 (quoting Camenisch v. University of
Tex., 616 F.2d 127, 133 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated as moot, 451 U.S. 390 (1981)) (citing inter alia Majors
v. Housing Authority, 652 F.2d 454, 457-58 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a woman with a mental
disability who required a dog was capable of enjoying the full benefit of public housing); Tatro v.
Texas, 625 F.2d 557, 563-64 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that with catheterization, a school girl would
realize the principal benefit from regular classroom instruction), rev'd in part sub nom, Irving Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984); Camenisch, 616 F.2d at 133 (finding that a deaf graduate
student could perform well, unlike the student in Davis who would not realize the principal benefits of
nursing school)).
158. E.g., Easley by Easley v. Snider, 841 F. Supp. 668, 673 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (requiring a state to
show that persons excluded are "incapable of experiencing the benefit' targeted by a state program of
attendant care), rev'd, 36 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 1994); Besharov & Silver, supra note 151, at 529 ("A good
argument can be made that anyone who can benefit from a heart transplant under purely medical criteria
is otherwise qualified.").
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(such as advanced breast cancer) is not "qualified" for the only treatment that
offers any hope of success (such as a bone marrow transplant).
However, the cases which have concluded that a person's capacity to benefit
from a government program is sufficient to qualify them for participation have
generally involved plaintiffs believed likely to experience the full benefit of
the program at issue in the case. 59 In noting this fact, the courts have left
themselves freedom to reach a different conclusion when the claimant has a
lesser chance to benefit than others who participate in the program. The most
important exception to this generalization is the Baby K case recently litigated
in Virginia.
1 60
In the case of Baby K, the trial court denied a hospital's request to withhold
ventilator care from an anencephalic baby. In concluding that nontreatment
would violate the disability rights laws, the district court appeared to assume
both that life is always beneficial and that a patient capable of benefitting
from treatment is presumptively "qualified" to receive it.' 6' "Dismal health
prospects" were not, in the court's eyes, a proper disqualifying factor. But the
trial court never considered whether a discriminatory eligibility criterion might
sometimes be necessary or essential to the program which uses it. In addition,
the presence of "quality of life" issues in the case muddies its significance as
precedent on the legitimacy of success rates. Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit
did not review the trial court's conclusions when it affirmed the decision on
other grounds. 62 As a result, the trial court's opinion stands alone. It is too
soon to discern whether other courts will accept or reject its conclusions, but
the opinion provides no real analysis to illuminate the issues raised when
survival rates are used to ration health care.
Indeed, other courts have reached precisely the opposite conclusion. These
courts have found that disabled patients denied potentially life-extending care
were not "qualified" within the meaning of the statute. 63 The Second
Circuit explained its position in this way: "In common parlance, one would
not ordinarily think of a newborn infant suffering from multiple birth defects
as being 'otherwise qualified' to have corrective surgery performed .... If
congress intended section 504 to apply in this manner, it chose strange
language indeed."'"
Neither set of cases is especially well-reasoned, and no case directly
considers the issue of effectiveness criteria such as survival rates. Rather than
159. See supra note 157.
160. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Va. 1993), affid, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994) (mem.).
161. Id. at 1027-28. The Fourth Circuit did not reach this issue on appeal. The trial court applied the
"qualifications" requirement of § 504, and then erroneously assumed that the absence of a "qualifica-
tions" requirement in Title II of the ADA precluded the use of discriminatory eligibility criteria. Id. at
1028. In fact, this title permits the use of "necessary" eligibility criteria.
162. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590.
163. See, e.g., Johnson by Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1493-94 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding
that the term "otherwise qualified" cannot ordinarily be applied in the fluid context of medical care
"without distorting its plain meaning"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1255 (1993); United States v. University
Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 156 (2d Cir. 1984).
164. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156.
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rely on these cases, future opinions are likely to address the substantive issue
anew. When this occurs, the sparse case law that now exists will play a very
limited role. Instead, the courts should look directly to the legislative history,
as discussed above, and the analogies and ethical implications, which are
considered below.
c. The Analogy to Education
One argument employed to defend the allocation of resources to those most
likely to benefit from them makes an analogy to the practices of educational
institutions in selecting the most qualified applicants to fill a limited number
of places66 5-- practices to which the federal courts have already given their
imprimatur.'" A similar analogy can be made to employers hiring the most
qualified applicants. Although this analogy could support the prioritization of
patients who can benefit the most from treatment, the argument for selection
of the most "qualified" patients is less powerful in the context of health care
than in the theoretically merit-based realms of education and employment. In
those contexts, a substantial consensus exists about the propriety of comparing
the abilities of all applicants. This consensus arises not only from society's
utilitarian interests in using the most skilled and productive workers and
graduates, but also from a widely-shared perception that decisions based on
"cmerit" are just. In addition, this merit-based paradigm must be judged against
the unrestricted discretion which preceded it: a climate ideal for nepotism,
cronyism, racism, and sexism.
The rich mixture of values which justify the use of selective qualifications
in employment and education does not transfer completely to health care
allocation. A preference for patients with positive outcomes evokes none of
the sense of just deserts accompanying merit-based employment decisions.
Persons whose conditions are especially resistant to cure would be denied care
while others who have the good fortune of suffering from a more curable
disease would receive it, even if the costs for each patient were equivalent
and both had paid their insurance premiums faithfully.
Nor does a health care plan's desire to maximize its outcomes carry the
same normative weight as a school's or an employer's desire to preserve its
reputation for high standards. Although a high quality health care system is
a legitimate objective, that goal is not advanced by treating only those patients
most likely to have positive outcomes. Treating these patients maximizes
outcomes, but has no bearing on quality of care.
Health care allocations based on medical effectiveness simply will not serve
all of the nonutilitarian values associated with selective hiring and admissions
criteria. In that sense, the case for effectiveness calculations in health care is
distinct and appears to be less powerful. As a result, the propriety of using
165. Merrikin & Overcast, supra note 85, at 15-17; see also Hadorn, supra note 36, at 1457
(analogizing health care qualifications to the nursing school qualifications sanctioned in Davis).
166. See, e.g., Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 777 (2d Cir. 1981).
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effectiveness measurements, such as survival rates, to determine a patient's
"qualifications" must be defended directly, rather than by analogy to
employment or education.
d. The Ethical Choice
The values of maximizing the number of lives and providing equal access
without regard to disability each have considerable moral and emotional
power. The choice between these values is difficult. To help make that choice,
it is useful to assume the hypothetical decision-makers' vantage point
popularized by the egalitarian philosopher John Rawls 67 and also used by
utilitarian economists. 68 That vantage point places decision-makers behind
a veil of ignorance where they are unaware of their own status and, thus, are
able to make decisions without personal conflicts of interest. The basic idea
is to create an ideal context for operation of the Golden Rule, 69 in which
decision-makers must shape rules for others that they would have govern their
own circumstances.
How would people who were unaware of their own current or future
medical circumstances make decisions about the use of survival rates? Rawls
believed that the position of ignorance would produce an agreement that no
inequalities in vital resources would be permitted unless they worked to the
benefit of the least well-off members of society. 7 The English philosopher
John Harris has concluded that QALYs would be ruled out by this principle
because they harm those with the worst life expectancies and quality of
life.'7'
However, Kenneth Arrow has described the unacceptable implications of the
egalitarian view. It implies that society should fund "medical procedures
which serve to keep people barely alive but with little satisfaction and which
are yet so expensive as to reduce the rest of the population to poverty." 72
167. RAWLS, supra note 121, at 12. Paul Menzel's theory of presumed consent is a close cousin.
Menzel suggests that autonomy, and not just efficiency, supports selective rationing. Menzel, supra note
43, at 65. Unlike my approach in the text, Menzel's theory does not depend upon the veil of ignorance
and appears to give veto power to subgroups whose condition gives them a different perspective on
tradeoffs acceptable to others. See PAUL T. MENZEL, STRONG MEDICINE 16, 22-36 (1990); Menzel,
supra note 43, at 62. Because he addressed only the disability-rights issues posed by QALYs in the
context of quality of life assessments, I have reserved further discussion of his approach for Part IV.
168. See J.C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare Individualistic Ethics and Personal Comparisons of Utility,
63 J. POL. ECON. 309, 316 (1955); W.S. Vickrey, Measuring Marginal Utility by Reactions to Risk 13
ECONOMEmRICA 319, 329 (1945).
169. Eddy, supra note 18, at 787.
170. RAWLS, supra note 121, at 62.
171. Harris, Unprincipled QALYs, supra note 115, at 188; see also Smith, supra note 120, at 1135.
It is assumed here that health care would constitute what Rawls calls "primary goods." RAWLS, supra
note 121, at 62.
172. Arrow, supra note 121, at 251. In the context of health care, egalitarians such as Daniels and
Veatch have also suggested that egalitarian obligations would cease when a preference for those with
the greatest need would unduly burden the social productivity necessary to provide services to them.
NORMAN DANIELS, JusT HEALTH CARE 84 (1985); VEATCH, supra note 115, at 159-60. This appears
to be an application of Rawls' differences principle, in which inequality can be justified if it makes even
the worst off better off. See supra text accompanying note 121. My textual argument for the use of
effectiveness criteria is not intended to be so limited.
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It is more reasonable to assume that unbiased individuals would choose to
place some limit on the premiums they would be willing to pay in order to
buy insurance for minimally effective treatments. Even Robert Veatch, a
prominent advocate of the egalitarian view, concedes that unbiased persons
would at some point conclude that insurance protection is no longer worth the
price. 7 3 Too many resources would be dedicated to nearly hopeless care.
Assume, for example, that treatments with a two-percent chance of cure and
a cost of $400,000 are considered by plan subscribers to be unaffordable ($20
million per life saved). Does fair treatment of disabled persons preclude the
application of this threshold whenever it would exclude a treatment which is
specific to a particular disability or comorbidity? To the contrary, justice for
all similarly situated patients requires that the threshold be applied uniformly
to all patients.
In this respect, rankings based on factors such as the likelihood of survival
are quite different from quality of life measurements, which place a lesser
value on the life of a disabled person. Survival rates do not depreciate the
lives of disabled persons, but instead treat all patients equally on the basis of
expected medical outcome. While diabetic heart patients may rank lower than
nondiabetic heart patients because their odds of survival are lower, they are
treated the same as other patients whose conditions are similarly resistant to
cure, such as patients with very advanced cancer or AIDS. From this
perspective, comorbidity classifications are not only defensible, but also
essential to avoid favoritism of the diabetic heart patient vis-i-vis the terminal
cancer patient. In the words of Alan Williams, "A particular improvement in
health status should be regarded as of equal value, no matter who gets it."'7 4
Likewise, survival rates reflect no invidious stereotypes, unlike reliance on
customer or co-worker preferences. Instead, success rates more closely
resemble other noninvidious considerations which legally can be used to
determine a person's eligibility, such as financial risk,'75 fortuitously
inherited talent, or an employer's considerable discretion to design a job
description.'7 6 While none of these qualifications allocate on the basis of
just deserts, they are at least free of prejudice or stereotype.
Given the lack of invidious stereotypes, the fact that all persons with similar
prognoses would be treated equally, and the strength of the presumption that
a just society would be willing to place limits on expenditures for ineffective
care, survival rates belong among the tools available to health planners, even
though facial discrimination against a disabled person may sometimes result.
Although some affirmative effort should be taken to ease the burdens of those
173. See VEATCH, supra note 115, at 156; Veatch, supra note 139, at 258 (concluding that rationing
of marginally ineffective care is inevitable).
174. Williams, supra note 125, at 123; see also Brock, supra note 28, at 95 (describing the argument
that prognosis is itself a "natural lottery" that is just if criteria are consistently applied). The words of
Justice Stewart are also apropos: "Sometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that
are different as though they were exactly alike .... Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
175. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) ("[C]onsideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what
functions of a job are essential ....").
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in society who are the worst off (e.g., by expanding access to insurance and
expanding the basic benefits package), giving them priority to receive
relatively ineffective health care will often be a poor way of advancing this
objective. Consequently, the law ought not require it.
e. The Likely Judicial Resolution
The legislative history provides some credible support for an egalitarian
interpretation of the disability rights laws, particularly in connection with
comorbidity. This interpretation is also bolstered by the weakness of the
analogy to higher education commonly made by defenders of QALYs. On the
other hand, the legislative history gives no indication that Congress considered
the impact of the disability rights laws on the measurement of health care
effectiveness. It seems likely that Congress would have signaled its intention
to alter the existing clinical and regulatory practice of taking medical
effectiveness into account. Given these conflicting considerations and the lack
of a dispositive answer in the case law, the courts have considerable
discretion to resolve this interpretive dispute as they wish.
Judicial resolution of this debate is likely to depend upon the level of
scrutiny that courts are inclined to give to challenged eligibility criteria. If
courts are inclined to reject only those criteria which reinforce or rely upon
proscribed stereotypes, then effectiveness criteria such as survival or success
rates will survive the test of legitimacy. But if courts look more closely to
determine the consistency of survival rates with the statutory goal of equal
opportunity, then the fate of survival rates is much less certain.
Because case-by-case judicial evaluation of program objectives would be an
extraordinarily complex and value-laden task, and because the courts have
received little guidance from Congress on the criteria to use in undertaking
this analysis, courts are likely to avoid close scrutiny of program objectives
when the criteria used appear to be free of invidious stereotypes, especially
if a significant modification of previously accepted practices would result
from rejection of the criteria. 77 This hypothesis is consistent with the
inclination of most courts to reject challenges to health benefits plans. All of
this augurs well for plans using reliable data about survival rates or success
rates, except possibly in the context of employment, where the permissibility
of non-underwriting eligibility criteria is less clear.
177. See Easley by Easley v. Snider, 841 F. Supp. 668, 673-74 (E.D. Pa. 1993), rev'd, 36 F.3d 297
(3d Cir. 1994) (permitting the state to target its goals rather than equally assist all persons capable of
benefitting from the program).
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3. Reasonable Accommodation
Even if survival rates are a permissible eligibility criterion, health plans
employing them must make reasonable modifications to their eligibility
criteria if doing so will help disabled persons qualify for treatment. In
determining how much accommodation is "reasonable" in other contexts such
as employment or education, courts often have considerable power to broker
a compromise between utility and equity, but they have surprisingly little
flexibility to do so in the context of health care rationing.
Although the kinds of modifications required by this doctrine are likely to
vary with the specific circumstances of the particular benefits plan or clinical
practice, some general observations are possible. First, the obligation to make
reasonable accommodations is likely to require reasonable efforts to improve
a disabled patient's amenability to treatment. If, for example, the current
status of a patient's diabetes disqualifies him from a needed surgery, efforts
should be made to improve the condition of the patient's diabetes before
making a final decision about surgery. Under some circumstances, reasonable
accommodation might even include the provision of social supports for those
whose recovery is threatened by their absence.'
Second, complete abandonment of effectiveness criteria is unlikely to be
required because it would constitute a "fundamental" alteration of the
program.'79 Even a request to drop only comorbidity-based exclusions would
be inconsistent with the fundamental objectives of the challenged pro-
gram.s Assuming that prioritization on the basis of effectiveness is proper,
the elimination of comorbidity considerations would resemble a request that
an educational institution lower its standards for the benefit of disabled
'178. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 6, at 296 (arguing that justice may require assistance
with social supports rather than using the absence of social supports as a reason for excluding a patient
from transplantation); DANIELS, supra note 172, at 46 (showing a societal obligation to correct social
conditions contributing to poor health).
179. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (stating the ADA's standard that modifications to public
accommodations which "fundamentally alter the nature of such services" are not required); Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979) (interpreting § 504); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)
(1994) (stating that modifications to public services which "fundamentally alter the nature of the
services" are not required). Employers have a similar limit on their obligations. They need not make
modifications which would impose an "undue burden" under the circumstances. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111(8)-(10), 12112(b)(5)(A).
180. It might be suggested, however, that the elimination of these classifications would not
fundamentally alter either the services offered or the quality of the ultimate product. Efficiency would
be lost and coverage of previously excluded patients might generate either additional costs or alternative
methods of allocating care, but these consequences are not unlike the types of accommodations routinely
required in other contexts, such as accessibility improvements, interpreters, job restructuring, and the
modification or acquisition of equipment. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). Although these
concessions are costly and may reduce the efficiency of the business, under the ADA they are obligatory
unless they impose an undue burden. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also Davis, 442 U.S. at 412-13
(interpreting § 504's reasonable accommodation standard). However, this contention overlooks the
ethical underpinning of effectiveness criteria. Effectiveness criteria aim to advance overall social welfare
and to treat patients equally with regard to their likelihood of benefit. If that is a legitimate program
objective, the elimination of disability-based classifications would undermine it and, in doing so, would
unfairly favor some patients merely because their misfortune arises from disability. This alteration would
be fundamental.
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candidates. The Supreme Court has concluded that such a request can exceed
the requirement of reasonable accommodation. 8 ' It is possible, however,
that a modification of this sort could be required in some factual circum-
stances if its impact on the overall operation of the plan would be minor.
Third, courts are unlikely to require the use of more sophisticated methods,
such as a weighted lottery, to reconcile efficiency with equality. In a weighted
lottery, patients who are most likely to benefit from a treatment might receive
several "lottery tickets" for every one given to candidates whose treatments
are much less likely to be successful." 2 Equality would be better served
under such a system than with complete exclusion of the patients with the
worst odds, because each patient would at least have a chance of selection in
the lottery. In addition, a significant amount of efficiency would still be
preserved by weighting the chances of each applicant to reflect their relative
odds of benefitting from treatment. Unfortunately, solutions of this type would
be extremely cumbersome to implement and perhaps unworkable altogether
as a method of making most insurance coverage decisions. Despite their
theoretical elegance, decisions made in this manner are probably less likely
to be perceived as rational or principled by the public and the persons affected
by the process than straightforward coverage restrictions. As a result, courts
are unlikely to require an accommodation of this sort in the foreseeable
future. Adventurous health plans will have to experiment successfully with
ideas of this sort before they are taken seriously.
Finally, plans could conceivably be required to offer their subscribers the
option of purchasing additional coverage for some or all of the treatments not
covered by the basic plan. Riders of this sort would expand patient choice by
permitting disabled patients with the resources to choose a more robust benefit
plan. Because these riders would expand choice without sacrificing the
allocation objectives of the basic benefits plan to which they are appended,
courts might be willing to require accommodation of this kind. As a practical
matter, however, these riders may be too costly to provide much additional
access. A disproportionate number of individuals who currently need or expect
to need these additional services are likely to subscribe, thereby forcing up
premiums. The high initial premiums will then drive out some of the healthier
purchasers, thereby forcing the price up farther still. Exclusion of patients
with preexisting conditions could minimize this effect, thereby making more
robust coverage more affordable, but only by denying insurance benefits to
the very disabled patients seeking to enhance their coverage for comparatively
ineffective care. 183 Furthermore, even if riders covering additional care are
offered, allocation decisions within each additional tier of coverage will
181. Davis, 442 U.S. at 410.
182. See Brock, supra note 28, at 97; John Broome, Good, Fairness and QALYs, in PHILOSOPHY AND
MEDICAL WELFARE 57, 62 (J.M. Bell & Susan Menders eds., 1988).
183. The failure of this accommodation returns us to the original question: whether the basic plan
should be required to include the excluded conditions (i.e., whether cross-subsidization should be
required for disabled patients who need comparatively ineffective care)? See Ellman & Hall, supra note
30, at 198 (expressing some interest in cross-subsidization between plans).
[Vol. 70:491
HeinOnline  -- 70 Ind. L.J. 530 1994-1995
1995] HEALTH CARE RATIONING 531
continue to raise the disability-rights issue discussed in this Article (i.e.,
whether disability rights law places limits on the use of effectiveness
measurements to allocate the additional resources).
4. Individualization
It is in the individualization requirement, rather than the obligation to make
reasonable accommodations, that the demands of equity most prominently
restrict the use of effectiveness criteria. Individualization is necessary to
minimize the exclusionary effect of otherwise defensible eligibility criteria.
Through this requirement, courts may demand a measure of sacrifice from
health plans before permitting the sacrifice asked of excluded patients.
In health care decision-making, the extent of individualization that is
feasible will depend upon the context. The implementation of practice
parameters by managed-care plans, for example, might be compatible with a
substantial amount of individual assessment. Treatment of patients with breast
cancer might depend upon the stage, cell type, and other factors likely to
influence outcome as well as the effectiveness of the treatment being
requested (e.g., chemotherapy, radiation, immunotherapy, surgery, or bone
marrow transplantation)."8 4 In that context, a substantial amount of individu-
alization may be clinically feasible and therefore legally obligatory.
Traditional insurance exclusions, on the other hand, are typically more
blunt. Sometimes, specific disabilities (such as AIDS or infertility) are
restricted or excluded. At other times, specific treatments for a particular
disability (such as bone marrow transplantation for breast cancer) may be
excluded because they are deemed "experimental." If available data would
permit a more precise identification of the persons with a poor prognosis, the
disability rights laws may require that this data be utilized before creating
disability-based exclusions.' 5 The broad categories used in Oregon probably
violated this requirement.'1
6
It is much more difficult to predict what courts will do when the best that
existing data permit is relatively broad exclusions. An analogy to this dilemma
arises in the employment discrimination context. Could employers exclude
women from the workplace based on statistical evidence that women are, on
the whole, absent more often?'8 7 Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964..8 allows religion, sex, and national origin to be taken into account
184. Hadorm, Setting Health Care Priorities, supra note 15, at 2223.
185. If cost-effectiveness were the basis for prioritization, then specific outcomes data would need
to be matched by similarly specific data on costs and quality of life scores before the data could be used
to re-rank treatments.
186. Oregon reportedly could have used existing data to be more specific in its designation of the
treatments to be ranked. Hadorn, Setting Health Care Priorities, supra note 15, at 2223. The State
adopted its less precise method of specifying services in order to facilitate actuarial analysis of the final
priority list.
187. The hypothetical is from MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DIscIuMNATIoN LAW 291 (1988);
see also Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (holding that a policy of excluding
female, but not male, job applicants with pr-school-age children raised a question of fact precluding
summary judgment for the employer).
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when they constitute a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business,"" 9 and, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act permits age to be considered under
similar circumstances, 0 this bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ")
defense is narrowly construed.' 9'
In Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell,192 an age discrimination case
addressing the issue of generalized exclusions, the Supreme Court insisted
upon individual assessments except when all or substantially all persons
excluded by the age restriction would be unable to perform the job safely and
efficiently. Alternatively, the Court would not require an individualized
assessment if it would be "impossible or highly impractical" to determine
which class members would perform unsafely or inefficiently.' 93 The case
involved a claim that pilots over sixty years of age presented a safety risk.
Under Criswell, individualization is not necessary when substantially all
excluded persons are unqualified. Applying this test to rationing criteria,
courts will ask how strong a predictor of outcomes the challenged criteria
really are. The greater the percentage of excluded persons whose outcomes are
likely to be significantly better than the cut-off, the less likely it is that a
disability-based criterion will survive scrutiny.
Criswell also condoned the failure to individualize when doing so was not
feasible, but it did so in a case where public safety was at risk. It is unclear
whether the Supreme Court would extend this exception to cases without a
public safety concern.'94 Maximization of health outcomes is, however, a
public safety objective. As a result, courts could also excuse the failure of
health plans to individualize when it would be highly impractical to do so. In
the context of rationing, feasibility would depend on factors such as the
availability of better predictive data, the cost of acquiring it, and the
administrative difficulty of using it.'95 The less feasible individualization is,
the more tolerable some overgeneralization should be, assuming that the
exclusions are otherwise empirically based and essential to the program.
As the Office of Technology Assessment noted in its evaluation of the
Oregon Plan, extremely precise categorization might be "unworkable for any
program purpose."' 96 Instead, it suggested intermediate levels of definition.
Concerns of this sort may help explain why the Federal Government permitted
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988).
190. 29 U.S.C. § 621(f)(1) (1988).
191. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
192. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
193. Id. at 416-17.
194. The EEOC Regulations do not limit the "impracticality" excuse to instances where safety is at
stake. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(b)(3) (1994).
195. Clinicians may be in a better position than benefits plans to make refined individualized
assessments of prognosis, but benefits plans have a stronger claim that their decision to use effectiveness
criteria is part of a coherent plan to maximize the use of finite resources, and is based on comparative
data. Some marriage of their interests may be needed. I plan to discuss this issue in a subsequent article
on bedside rationing.
196. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, SUMMARY: EVALUATION OF THE OREGON PLAN 8
(1992).
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Oregon to use aggregate conclusions about mortality to rank broad categories
of illness without any mention of the individualization requirement.
C. Conclusions About Survival Rates
Although the choice is a troubling one, the case for permitting allocation
decisions based on survival rates is legally and ethically more persuasive.
Survival rates do not present the same risks of invidious discrimination that
would be present if quality of life or social worth were considered. Persons
with equal prognoses are treated equally. Under these circumstances,
reasonable, unbiased persons would very likely permit limits to be placed on
funding for the least successful treatments, even if doing so were to result in
disability-based classifications.
This endorsement of survival rates has four important qualifications. First,
it is unclear whether courts will permit the use of any exclusionary criteria in
connection with employee health benefits. Second, programs using effective-
ness criteria must individualize their decision-making to the maximum extent
feasible. Third, plans may need to offer riders for coverage of less successful
treatments. Fourth, this entire discussion has assumed that the eligibility
criteria being employed by a plan or its providers have a legitimate empirical
basis. Classifications that lack a defensible empirical basis are hardly
"essential" to the goal of maximizing health outcomes. Because reliance on
judgment or intuition introduces a risk that unfounded stereotypes about, or
prejudice against, disabled persons and their outcomes have infected the data,
it may be difficult to convince courts that clinical judgment or experience,
standing alone, is sufficient.
IV. QUALITY OF LIFE CONSIDERATIONS
Quality of life matters. The value to Barney Clark of Jarvik's artificial heart
would be greatly overestimated if no consideration were given to the quality
of Clark's extra days of life. If impact on quality of life were ignored,
treatments for relatively minor conditions, such as hemorrhoids, could rank
above treatments with a more dramatic impact on patient well-being, such as
symptomatic relief for dementia, as long as the less serious conditions were
cheaper or easier to treat. A rational system for allocating health care
resources needs to consider the anticipated impact of treatment on patient
quality of life.""7
But quality of life considerations disfavor disabled patients. Saving the life
of a person who will have a residual impairment after treatment'98 will
generate fewer QALYs than saving the life of a person who could be returned
197. E.g., Brock, supra note 28, at 89; Maynard, supra note 16, at 1540; Orentlicher, supra note 36,
at 312.
198. David Hadom has suggested that discrimination on the basis offuture disability is not prohibited
by current law. Hadom, supra note 36, at 1456-57. His argument is not trivial and cannot be adequately
explored here, although I disagree with his conclusion.
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to full function, because the value assigned to a year of additional life with
full function is greater than that assigned to a year with a serious impairment.
In some circumstances, disabled patients could also be disfavored by
considering quality of life in the ranking of noncritical care. For example,
their disabilities could impede their recovery from other illnesses or limit the
amount of functional improvement that successful therapy makes possible., 9
In addition to their discriminatory consequences, quality of life
measurements introduce a special risk of bias. Quality of life measurements
can never have the medical or scientific objectivity of survival .rates. No
scientific Rosetta stone will tell us whether it is worse to be infertile, arthritic,
or unconscious, or whether more good will be accomplished by a partial cure
of severe arthritis than by a complete cure of nearsightedness. These are value
judgments. Any scale generated to reflect these judgments must avoid biased
misconceptions about the actual impact of disabilities on the lives of persons
who have them.00 Indeed, concerns that Oregon had overestimated the
impact of some disabilities on patient quality of life contributed significantly
to the initial rejection of the Oregon plan.''
Nevertheless, the problem of bias should not be overstated. Improper bias
can be avoided by utilizing a study design that includes an appropriate role
for disabled persons in creating the value scale.02 In some circumstances,
199. For a more detailed discussion of the impact of quality of life considerations in the context of
noncritical care, see infra part IV.B.
200. Discrepancies between the views of disabled persons and the general public have been observed
in some contexts but not others. Compare OREGON HEALTH SERvs. COMM'N, supra note 12, at C-Il
(revealing that persons who had experienced a problem sometimes rated it less severely than those who
had not and acknowledging similar results in other studies); Hadom, Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise,
supra note 15, at 12 (citing studies showing that persons without disabilities undervalue the quality of
life of persons with disabilities); Michael O'Donnell, One Man's Burden, 291 BRrr. MED. J. 60, 60
(1985) (finding that once patients become ill, they are less likely to prefer a short healthy life to a longer
one with a disability); Rosser & Kind, supra note 33, at 352-55 (finding that patients with current
medical illness produced lower scales but psychiatric patients had higher ones); David L. Sackett &
George W. Torrance, The Utility of Different Health States as Perceived by the General Public, 31 3.
CHRONIC Dis. 697, 702-03 (1978) (finding that renal dialysis patients ranked both hospital and home
dialysis more favorably than healthy respondents did); Williams, supra note 11, at 327 (noting that
physicians overstate the impact of disability) with Donald J. Balaban et al., Weights for Scoring the
Quality of Well-Being Instrument Among Rheumatoid Arthritics: A Comparison to General Population
Weights, 24 MED. CARE 973, 979 (1986) (finding that the scores of the general population and those
of patients with severe to moderate rheumatoid arthritis were in close agreement); Hadom, supra note
36, at 1455 (finding no bias in Oregon); Torrance, supra note 16, at 16 (reviewing the literature and
concluding that patients and the public produced similar scales); id. at 27 (describing studies by
Churchill in which patient utilities correlated significantly with nephrologists' ratings of patient quality
of life).
201. Marzen Letter, supra note 46, reprinted in 9 IsSuEs L. & MED. at 400; Sullivan Letter, supra
note 38, reprinted in 9 IssUES L. & MED. at 409.
202. If disabled patients rank a functional impairment differently than the general public, a difficult
methodological problem arises. Whose opinions should govern? Only a thumbnail outline of an answer
is possible here. Defending the Oregon plan, David Hadom rejected reliance on the preferences of
disabled persons. Relying on the insurance principle, he stated that "[tihe preferences used to determine
coverage ... should be those of the beneficiaries prior to any need for specific treatment... The
assumption that post hoc preferences of disabled persons should prevail over those of the general
citizenry is, therefore, problematic." Hadom, supra note 36, at 1456 (emphasis added); see Hadom,
Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise, supra note 15, at 15; see also Eddy, supra note 18, at 786-87
(suggesting a representative sample of persons "at risk"). Hadom's concern is that the answers of
disabled persons will be self-serving.
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suspected shortcomings in the data will have no prejudicial impact on the
rankings.0 3 As a result, defensible data can very likely be generated. But
even if the scales are valid, their use will potentially disfavor individuals with
disabilities. The distributive justice dilemma caused by this discriminatory
potential is the subject of this Part.
The use of quality of life considerations is especially problematic when the
treatments being ranked are potentially life-saving. When life is at stake, the
value of the life saved is determined by the person's anticipated quality of
life. In effect, a lower value is placed on the life of a disabled patient than on
the life of a patient whose health can be more fully restored. Treating the
lives of disabled persons as less valuable directly challenges fundamental
assumptions about the equal worth of all citizens. For this reason, the use of
quality of life considerations to rank treatments is far more controversial than
reliance upon success rates.2"4 Michael J. Astrue, who was general counsel
of the Department of Health and Human Services at the time of Oregon's
original application for Medicaid waivers, has characterized Oregon's use of
quality of life considerations as "the most troubling element of the pro-
cess."
205
By contrast, no threat to the presumption of equal worth arises when
QALYs are used to rank noncritical care because life is not at stake. Both
critics and defenders of quality of life considerations have often overlooked
Hadom's defense of community polling has three important weaknesses. First, it overlooks the first-
hand experience of disabled individuals. If the discriminatory impact of QALYs is justified because
QALYs will help to maximize health care outcomes, then the actual impact of the disability is the
crucial concern, not the perceived or feared impact. Second, Hadorn's position ignores the biases that
could infect the answers of nondisabled respondents. Finally, it overstates the circumstances in which
biased answers from disabled respondents are likely to be a serious danger. In most circumstances, the
risk is minimized because incorrect answers can harm as well as help disabled respondents. For example,
a skewed answer which improves a disabled respondent's priority for critical care (by understating the
impact of the disability) is likely to prejudice that person's priority for noncritical care (by understating
the value of a cure for the disability) and vice versa. Offsetting effects of this kind will be present in
most circumstances. Ordinarily, therefore, the views of disabled respondents should govern.
203. Biased data can be harmless or actually favor disabled patients. The error would be harmless
if the affected disabilities are funded anyway or the bias was not significant enough to affect the
rankings. A favorable impact could occur if, for example, an overestimate of a disabling condition's
severity resulted in a higher ranking for treatments which alleviate the improperly evaluated condition.
204. Many critics condemn quality of life considerations and conclude that they impermissibly
discriminate against persons with disabilities. See Letter from Timothy B. Flanagan, assistant attorney
general, Office of Legal Counsel to Susan K. Zagame, acting general counsel, Department of Health and
Human Services (Jan. 19, 1993), reprinted in 9 IssuEs L. & MED. 418 (1994); Stade, supra note 45,
at 2010, 2017-20 (suggesting that quality of life considerations violate the ADA, but recommending that
the statute be amended to permit their use); Sullivan Letter, supra note 38, reprinted in 9 IssuES L. &
MED. at 409; James V. Garvey, Note, Health Care Rationing and the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990: What Protection Should the Disabled Be Afforded?, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 581, 584, 615
(1993). This was also the basis of the Federal Government's objection to the Oregon rationing plan.
Sullivan Letter, supra note 38, reprinted in 9 IsSUES L. & MED. at 409; see also supra text
accompanying notes 55-64. On the other hand, ethicist Paul Menzel and health economist David Hadorn,
for example, support the use of quality of life rankings to prioritize health decisions. See Hadorn,
Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise, supra note 15, at 11; Hadorn, supra note 36, at 1455; Menzel, supra
note 44, at 21; see also Capron, supra note 43, at 20 (suggesting that ranking is permitted, but
exclusions based on disability are not).
205. Astrue, supra note 34, at 381.
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the implications of this distinction between the extension of life and the relief
of symptoms. This Part explores the issues raised by quality of life consider-
ations in the two distinct contexts of critical and noncritical care.
A. Life-Extending Care
Because quality of life considerations do not treat all lives as equally
valuable, they present a troubling ethical and legal issue when potentially life-
saving treatments are ranked against each other.
1. The Special Problems Raised by Quality of Life
Few would disagree with the initial premise that the lives of all members
of the community should be treated as having equal worth." 6 Yet, the use
of quality of life considerations to rank treatments for fatal illnesses threatens
this principle. This calculation disfavors both individuals who currently have
permanent functional impairments and individuals who are likely to have
residual impairments after treatment because "saving their lives would
produce fewer QALYs than saving the lives of healthier people."2 7 As a
result, critics correctly contend that QALYs do not treat the lives of all
individuals as equally valuable.2"8 Oregon's low ranking of treatment for
very premature babies under 500 grams was perceived by the Federal
Government and David Hadorn as reflecting this kind of calculus.0 9 Much
more than survival rates, quality of life considerations seem to threaten the
egalitarian values underlying the disability rights laws.
When quality of life is taken into account, the very fact that a patient is
disabled will automatically put that person at a disadvantage. A low quality
of life score would not only result in a lower priority as against other fatal
conditions, but would also increase the risk that this patient's life-saving care
would receive a lower priority than treatments for some nonfatal conditions.
From the egalitarian perspective, "[e]veryone who wants to go on living-
however uncomfortable their continued existence may be or however brief its
expectation-possesses something of equal value." ' "Let's call it," said
another critic of quality of life considerations, "the rest of their lives. 2 1.
206. VEATCH, supra note 115, at 121-23; Charles J. Dougherty, Ethical Values at Stake in Health
Care Reform, 268 JAMA 2409 (1992) (arguing that this premise is one foundation of individual moral
rights); Harris, QALYfying the Value of Life, supra note 115, at 118 (suggesting that the idea is at the
root of both democratic theory and most conceptions of justice).
207. Hadom, Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise, supra note 15, at 13 (claiming that if treatments offer
equal additional life, QALYs favor those that offer the best quality of life and disfavor those which offer
marginal prolongation of life with severe side effects); Menzel, supra note 43, at 60.
208. E.g., Harris, QALYfying the Value of Life, supra note 115, at 121-22; Garvey, supra note 204,
at 584 & n.15 (citing legislative testimony on this point).
209. See Hadorn, Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise, supra note 15, at 12.
210. O'Donnell, supra note 200, at 60.
211. Id. (quoting John Harris).
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The use of quality of life assessments for life-saving care also reduces the
value of life (and thus the benefits of life-saving treatment) to a simple
formula that multiplies quality of life by life expectancy.2 2 John Rawles
correctly observes that "[l]ife is valued for infinitely more reasons than
absence of suffering."'2 " He reminds us that "to equate the value of life with
absence of disability or distress is to undervalue existence very greatly
indeed. 214
2. Potential Justifications
At least four arguments in support of quality of life considerations are
possible. One, suggested by David Hadorn, is that quality of life measure-
ments are appropriate because they measure the expected change in quality
of life, rather than the point-in-time quality of life of the patient.2 '5 This net
change, he claims, is evaluated in the same manner for disabled patients as
for everyone else. Hadorn's analysis, however, fails to appreciate the
difference between fatal and nonfatal conditions. When the condition being
treated is potentially fatal, the "change" or net benefit offered by treatment
is the extension of life.21 6 To measure the change is, therefore, to measure
the value of the life itself, a point-in-time assessment.
A second potential justification is that quality of life is measured from the
patient's perspective, not society's. QALYs typically do not attempt to
establish the social worth of an individual by measuring factors like future
employment prospects or moral character. Instead, scales such as Oregon's are
intended to estimate value conferred on the patient by life-sustaining care. As
a result, QALYs avoid the most objectionable kind of utility calculus. 2' 7
212. Harris, QALYfying the Value of Life, supra note 115 (arguing vigorously that quality of life
measurements cannot accurately reflect the real value of life to the people whose lives receive low
rankings); Rawles, supra note 16, at 146. This objection may also suggest more concern with the
variability of people's quality of life and the difficulty of capturing it through clinical indicia of the sort
that would be used to predict survival rates. Cf. Avom, supra note 115, at 1299 (noting patient
variability in quality of life assessments).
213. Rawles, supra note 16, at 146; see also Broome, supra note 182, at 66; Smith, supra note 120,
at 1135.
214. Rawles, supra note 16, at 146. For this reason, Rawles also objects to comparisons between
treatments which are lifesaving and those which are not.
215. Hadom, Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise, supra note 15, at 12-13; see also Capron, supra note
43, at 20. Emery and Schneiderman make the same argument. Danielle D. Emery and Lawrence J.
Schneiderman, Cost-EffectivenessAnalysis in Health Care, HASTINGS CTR. REP., July-Aug. 1989, 8, 11
(assuming that all ill people are equally favored).
216. Hadorn's observations are, however, valid in the context of nonfatal conditions. See infra text
accompanying note 243.
217. See, e.g., In re Julia Warren, 858 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (Smart, J., concurring)
(disapproving of social worth calculations in decisions to withhold life-sustaining care); In re Conroy,
486 A.2d 1209, 1232-33 (N.J. 1985) (making a similar argument); BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra
note 6, at 294 (distinguishing medical utility from social utility and asserting that medical utility
maximizes collective patient welfare while social utility maximizes social welfare); Besharov & Silver,
supra note 151, at 526 (discussing objections to utilitarian approaches that take into account a person's
"value to society"); Orentlicher, supra note 36, at 312 (suggesting that social worth criteria are
inappropriate). Social worth considerations could include factors such as occupation, family status,
religion or character, criminal record, intelligence and education. Besharov & Silver, supra note 151,
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This distinction is significant, but not sufficient. While it avoids some of the
most damaging objections raised against unrestricted utilitarian calculations,
it does not respond to the objection that QALYs treat the lives of disabled
persons as less worthy of saving.
Paul Menzel, by far the most lucid and thoughtful writer on this subject,
raises a third possible defense. He suggests that reasonable persons would
consent to the use of quality of life considerations because the harm to those
most in need of care which results from their use in some contexts is offset
by the advantage that they will confer on those individuals in other circum-
stances. That advantage would accrue when treatment for nonfatal conditions
is ranked. Here, those most in need of care will often have more to gain from
successful treatment.2" 8 Menzel calls this package of favorable and unfavor-
able consequences the "QALY bargain" and seems to presume that reasonably
healthy persons would consent to it if asked in advance of illness." 9
Because he presumes their consent, he views his theory as autonomy-based.
Although Menzel's insight is extremely valuable, his theory of presumed
consent has two important limitations. First, Menzel suggests that his
presumed consent rationale would not apply to persons with congenital
handicaps or those with illnesses that began before the patient was old enough
to consent to the QALY bargain.22 He dislikes the consent approach here
because patients in these circumstances have had no opportunity to take
account of their prospects and make real or presumed choices about
insurance. 22' This precludes predictions based on the experience of real
persons. Because Menzel is unwilling to use a Rawlsian hypothetical
standpoint to make decisions about the care provided to this group of patients,
he gives a veto or opt-out power to disabled persons who cannot be presumed
to have previously consented to the QALY bargain. 2 2 He concedes that "[i]t
is not clear what disabled people themselves would say about [the QALY
bargain.] ' 23 If they would accept it, Menzel's autonomy-based theory
provides important support for the use of QALYs. If they would reject it,
however, QALY use cannot be based on his theory of consent.
at 525. Sometimes they can masquerade as medical factors. Id. at 522, 527 (discussing heart
transplantation criteria). The use of social worth considerations in the 1970's by hospital committees
allocating kidney dialysis was very controversial. See 3 SECURING AccEss TO HEALTH CARE, supra note
20, at 285, 306 (suggesting that capacity to contribute to society influences ICU resource allocation).
218. MENZEL, supra note 167, at 80-81; Menzel, supra note 43, at 60-61.
219. MENZEL, supra note 167, at 85-86; Menzel, supra note 43, at 61.
220. MENZEL, supra note 167, at 62.
221. Id. at 99-102. Nor do patients realistically stand to receive off-setting benefits from cost-saving
measures. Id. But, because Menzel concludes that they are not persons, he ultimately concludes that life-
saving care can be rationed using the same cost-effectiveness limits to which adults consent Id. at 107.
I agree with his conclusion about newborns, but on a different basis. Although real persons have no
experience with preconception choices, it seems fair to extrapolate from our views about the funding
of post-birth conditions which resemble congenital ones, rather than to give congenitally disabled
children a uniquely favored status.
222. MENZEL, supra note 167, at 16, 22-36; Menzel, supra note 43, at 62.
223. Menzel, supra note 44, at 23.
[Vol. 70:491
HeinOnline  -- 70 Ind. L.J. 538 1994-1995
HEALTH CARE RATIONING
The second limitation on Menzel's theory is that disabled persons could
object to the bundling of life-saving and nonlife-saving care. They might
plausibly suggest that QALY use is permissible to rank noncritical care but
not to rank life-saving care. QALYs are proper when noncritical care is
prioritized because, depending upon the circumstances, they can either favor
or disfavor disabled patients. 4 When life-saving care is ranked, on the
other hand, quality of life considerations automatically and inevitably disfavor
disabled patients. Once the two kinds of care are evaluated separately, the
possible benefits conferred by QALYs in the context of noncritical care
disappear as a justification for the use of QALYs to rank life-saving care. As
a result, the QALY bargain requires supplementation.
The fourth and strongest reason for taking quality of life into account is that
quality of life really does influence the value of life.225 Indeed, some legal
and ethical commentators doubt that treatments can be rationally prioritized
without considering quality of life.226 This claim of relevance directly
challenges the factual accuracy of the equal worth presumption.
Both David Hadorn and Alexander Morgan Capron point out that even
disabled patients would prefer not to be disabled.22 Surely, Hadorn suggests,
a life-sustaining treatment that offers months of pleasurable life is preferable
to one that promises months of debilitating side effects. 228 Hadorn's
assumption seems to make common sense. But does it mean that disabled
patients would agree with the conclusion that their lives are of less value to
them than those of persons with no impairments? 229 As Paul Menzel
observes, "For all we know, compared to death, your paraplegic life could be
still as valuable to you as anyone else's 'better' life is to him or her."23
This is an empirical question. And it seems likely that the presumption of
equal value is inaccurate, at least in extreme cases. The strongest evidence of
this is provided by the decisions made daily by patients and their families to
discontinue life-sustaining care. Quality of life inescapably plays a vital role
in these life-and-death decisions. The substantial consensus that supports these
end-of-life practices provides a plausible basis for believing both that poor
224. See infra part IV.B for a further discussion of noncritical care.
225. E.g., Dougherty, supra note 43, at Supp. 6 (finding that quality of life and prevention topped
the list of values articulated in Oregon community meetings); Hadorn, Oregon Prionry-Setting Exercise,
supra note 15, at 12 (revealing that Oregon surveys demonstrated the importance of quality of life to
community members).
226. E.g., Menzel, supra note 44, at 25; Note, The Oregon Health Care Proposal and the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1296, 1312-13 (1993).
227. Hadom, supra note 36, at 1455; Capron, supra note 43, at 20. For an interesting contrary view,
see Edward Dolnick, Deafness as Culture, ATLANTrc, Sept. 1993, at 37.
228. Hadom, Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise, supra note 15, at 13; Hadom, supra note 36, at 1455.
229. Harris, QALYfying the Value of Life, supra note 115, at 118, 121 (asserting that preferring a
better quality of life over a worse one does not commit one to a judgment that persons with better
quality of life should be saved first).
230. Menzel, supra note 43, at 61 (emphasis in original); see also Harris, QALYfying the Value of
Life, supra note 115, at 118, 121. One possible explanation for a contrary answer to this question lies
in the nonhealth benefits of being alive, which may correspond poorly with disability.
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quality of life can diminish the value of life and also that our society
condones quality of life assessments, even when made by third parties. 31
If some life-extending care is fairly perceived as not in a patient's best
interests, it seems a small additional step to conclude (contrary to the trial
court's assumptions in Baby K) that some life-extending treatments are barely
beneficial from the patient's perspective. Barely beneficial care is a candidate
for low priority. Indeed, this assumption is already reflected in existing
clinical practices such as the allocation of intensive care resources" and
organs for transplantation.2 3
Allocations of potentially beneficial care, however, are unlike individual
decisions about a patient's best interests in one important respect. When
allocation decisions are made, the value of saving one patient's life is
compared with the value of saving another patient's life. This comparative
aspect of allocations based on the effectiveness of treatment threatens the
principle of equal woith in a way that individual best interests decisions do
not. This is the point at which a value choice must be made between
maximizing benefits from scarce resources and presuming equal worth-a
choice between utility and equality. Must genuine differences in the value of
life-saving treatment to the affected individuals be ignored to protect the
principle of equal worth? This is the most difficult question posed by resource
allocations based on medical effectiveness.
The choice is not, of course, an all-or-nothing one. Even assuming that the
egalitarian view should prevail as a general rule because it is more consistent
with the spirit of the disability rights laws, exceptions for extreme cases seem
justifiable. At some point, unbiased persons would agree in advance that
insuring themselves for barely beneficial treatment was no longer worth the
expense. At some point, the social costs of insuring low-benefit life-extending
care become so great that they outweigh the harm which would be done to the
principle of equal worth.
Assume, for example, that a vegetative patient, or perhaps more poignantly,
an elderly and severely demented patient, who cannot recognize or interact
with family or caregivers, needs dialysis, an organ transplantation, or develops
a cancer that would be treated at great expense if it occurred in an otherwise
231. My conclusions in this Article about the use of quality of life considerations by health plans
to prioritize critical care do not necessarily carry over to individual bedside decisions about withholding
life-sustaining care. Several factors distinguish those decisions. Most importantly, they typically involve
individualized decisions about a patient's best interests. When that is the issue, the value of that patient's
life is not being compared to the value of other patients' lives. In addition, individualized patient
decisions can take into account patient preferences, patient values, and information about the patient's
nonhealth quality of life. Further, the bedside treatment decision is often a dispute over the duty to treat,
not a dispute over funding or access to a pool of shared resources. Finally, the disability rights statutes
do not apply to the decisions of patients or their families. As a result, the impact of the anti-
discrimination laws on individual medical treatment decisions requires separate and extended discussion.
232. See Mulley, supra note 20, at 306 (concluding that ICU allocations are influenced by impaired
functional status).
233. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: IssuEs AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 87 (1986) (finding that organs are allocated to those with the best odds of survival
and the highest quality of life).
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healthy person.234 Assume further that this patient has previously requested
maximally aggressive medical care and that her odds of cure are no lower
than those of a healthy person. Must her health plan cover her care? The same
question could be asked about very low birth weight babies with a dismal
prognosis. 235 A decision to preclude quality of life assessments for these
cases is effectively a decision to devote resources to these patients that could
otherwise be used to expand the unmet or underserved medical needs of other
patients or to keep spiraling health costs in control.us These are the social
costs of an absolute equal worth principle.
Given these costs, the presumption of equal worth should yield in extreme
cases.237 These cases will typically have three characteristics. First, the
patient's quality of life is so poor that the net benefit to the patient from life-
extending treatment is open to question. Second, the patient's cognitive
function is so severely impaired that the nonhealth benefits of being alive are
unlikely to be significant, leaving health status as a reasonable barometer of
quality of life. Third, the anticipated costs of life-extending care are
extraordinary. Patients in a persistent vegetative state meet all three criteria.
By one account, medical care cost one such patient $700,000 for nine months
of additional comatose life.238 By contrast, quadriplegic patients would not
meet all three criteria; life-saving treatment for them could not be disfavored.
Ultimately, Congress should address this conflict as part of the national
health care debate. Limits or exceptions to the principle of equal worth ideally
ought to be the product of a public and democratic process in which the
choice is made explicit. Regrettably, exceptions seem necessary. Resources
are finite and quality of life is relevant. Nevertheless, several factors suggest
that movement in this direction should be cautious. The first is the absence
of sufficient political, medical, or public discussion of this conflict between
equity and utility and the resulting absence of public consensus about concrete
cases. Another is the difficulty of detecting bias in the quality of life
estimates made on behalf of these patients. Adult patients with Alzheimer's
disease or children born with severe birth defects cannot tell us about their
quality of life.239 Finally, better information is needed regarding the cost
234. For an actual example, see supra text accompanying note S.
235. Oregon had concluded that these babies should receive a low priority and Florida is considering
a similar proposal. See Florida Legislator Outlines State's Next Reform Steps, supra note 29, at 7.
236. I am indebted'to Haavi Morreim for reminding me of this consideration.
237. For an alternative proposal, see E. Haavi Morreim, Futilitarianism, Exoticare, and Coerced
Altruism: The ADA Meets Its Maker, 25 SErON HALL L. REv. (forthcoming 1995) (manuscript at 36-37,
on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (proposing that standards similar to those contained in the federal
Child Care Abuse Amendments be adopted).
238. Menzel, supra note 43, at 59 (reporting the costs for Helen Wanglie). Some commentators
propose a three-month cap on treatment. See Veatch & Spicer, supra note 115, at 30.
239. As a result, the scales generated by healthy individuals cannot be tested for bias by comparison
with the views of persons who have these disabilities. Only indirect tests are possible. For example, the
scores given to these conditions can be checked for consistency with patient-based scores given for less
catastrophic conditions or for similar, but temporary, conditions. As an additional safeguard, the scores
given by healthy respondents for these catastrophic conditions could be adjusted by a factor which
reflects the extent of bias detected in the scoring of other conditions. And scoring could be intuitively
tested by taking into account the best available medical information about life with these catastrophic
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savings to be obtained by denying care in extreme cases. It is possible that
most of the cases involving unwise resource use can be resolved on another
basis which does not infringe the principle of equal worth, such as patient
preferences, underwriting cost, or survival rates. Oregon's exclusion of very
premature, low birth weight babies, for example, may be defensible on the
basis of survival rates, regardless of quality of life. If so, the efficiency
advantages of taking quality of life into account could be less than expected.
3. Judicial Resolution
Until Congress addresses this conflict between equality and social welfare,
courts will have to interpret the existing statutes. Under these circumstances,
the legal requirement that discriminatory eligibility- criteria be essential is
sufficiently elastic to permit courts to reject quality of life considerations if
they wish to do so, much as they have rejected discrimination based on
customer preferences. The differences between survival rates and quality of
life considerations are sufficient to permit courts to sanction one while
prohibiting the other. First, assigning a lower value to the life of a disabled
person is inconsistent with the presumption of equal worth. Second, the use
of quality of life measurements is arguably less essential than the use of
success rates. If the use of survival rates were unlawful, the use of all other
measures of effectiveness would be unlawful as well. If quality of life
considerations were prohibited because of their unique attributes, on the other
hand, health planners would remain free to take into account both survival
rates and costs when ranking life-saving care.
Given the fundamental nature of the principle of equal worth, the absence
of either legislative history or public consensus for an exception to the
principle in this context, the danger of undetected bias, and the incomplete-
ness of utility calculations which evaluate life-saving care purely on the basis
of health status, courts will reasonably be reluctant to permit unrestricted use
of quality of life considerations to rank life-saving care." This general rule
would preclude the use methodologies, such as those used in the 1991 Oregon
plan, which disfavor all life-saving treatments that leave patients with residual
disabilities. Instead, health planners would have to rely on survival rates and
underwriting considerations.24 '
conditions and about the patient's awareness. Finally, courts and planners could consider any social
consensus that has developed regarding the desirability of receiving treatment under these circumstances.
None of these methods of controlling for bias is foolproof. Accordingly, courts may perceive the danger
of error as yet another reason to be reluctant about allowing quality of life considerations to influence
the allocation of life-saving care in the absence of either a public consensus or legislative guidance.
240. However, quality of life could still be used to compare treatments for a single disease. See
Menzel, supra note 44, at 23. But see Sullivan Letter, supra note 38, reprinted in 9 ISSUES L. & MED.
at 411-12 (objecting to Oregon's preference for prevention over treatment).
241. In this manner, life-saving treatments can also be ranked against each other and against
noncritical care. Noncritical care could potentially outrank life-saving care even if quality of life
considerations are not used. For example, an ineffective and expensive treatment for a fatal illness could
be ranked lower than an effective and cheap treatment for a terrible (but nonfatal) disability. Making
this comparison, of course, would require either an explicit or implicit assignment of some value to the
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Against the framework of this general rule precluding unchecked devalua-
tion of the lives of disabled persons, however, courts could then consider
exceptions (such as the one outlined above) which attempt to identify those
cases in which the goal of maximizing health care outcomes with finite
resources outweighs the principle of equal worth. Most likely, courts will
await more specific guidance from Congress. But the time has come to discuss
the limits of the principle of equal worth.
B. Nonfatal Conditions
On the surface, the use of quality of life to rank the treatments for nonfatal
conditions such as arthritis, infertility, and dental disease appears to raise
precisely the same issues posed by the ranking of fatal conditions. Perhaps for
this reason, the Federal Government did not differentiate between fatal and
nonfatal conditions when it objected to quality of life considerations in the
Oregon plan.
The similarity is only superficial. The legal and ethical issues are surpris-
ingly different when treatments for nonfatal conditions, such as infertility and
mental illness, are ranked on the basis of effectiveness. First, no value is
placed on a person's life. Second, the use of quality of life considerations can
benefit some disabled patients when noncritical care is ranked, whereas it
uniformly disfavors them when life-extending care is ranked.242 Third,
QALY measurements here are less likely to omit important information
because life is not at stake. As a result, quality of life considerations are more
legitimate in connection with noncritical care. These differences have not yet
been explored in the legal literature and do not appear to have been
recognized in the debate over the Oregon plan.
saving of a human life. Understandably, some debate might accompany the determination of that value.
And, some would object to the very enterprise on the ground that life-saving care should always receive
priority over noncritical care. See, e.g., Harris, QALYfying the Value of Life, supra note 115, at 120;
Rawles, supra note 16, at 146-47; cf. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS
IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAvIORAL RESEARCH, FOREGOING LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
100 (1983) (asserting that cost containment should not begin with consideration of life-sustaining
treatments); Menzel, supra note 43, at 66 n.20 (suggesting that comparisons between critical and
noncritical care are more difficult, but not indicating why); Orentlicher, supra note 36, at 312 (claiming
that calculations tend to undervalue the preservation of life); see also, Daniels, supra note 33, at 28
(suggesting that humans do not simply aggregate the benefits of noncritical care, such as toothcapping,
when comparing them to the benefits of life-saving care, such as an appendectomy). This contention
could be based either on a perception of greater need or on a belief in the sanctity of life. But as long
as the same value is assigned to all lives, no equal worth or disability rights issues are raised. For that
reason, I will not address this interesting and important issue in this Article.
242. This also reduces the danger of prejudice from biased overestimates of the impact of a disability
on the patient's quality of life. Such errors will often elevate, rather than reduce, the priority given to
people with disabilities. See infra parts IV.B.2-3.
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1. The Equal Value of Life
When nonfatal treatments are ranked, a value need not be placed upon the
worth of the patient's life because avoidance of death is not one of the
benefits attributed to the treatment. As a result, comparative values are not
placed on the lives of different classes of patients and, consequently, no harm
is done to the principle that all lives have equal worth. In the context of
noncritical care, QALYs instead help measure the value of improvements in
quality of life. It is in this context that Hadorn's thesis about quality of life
assessments is correct: they measure the net change in the quality of life
offered by a treatment rather than the point-in-time quality of life of the
patient.
Critics of quality of life considerations have typically ignored this
distinction between critical care and noncritical care. Instead, they have
simply assumed that quality of life is an inappropriate consideration.243 Yet,
these critics invariably base their objection on the tendency of QALYs to
devalue the lives of disabled persons. This defect of quality of life measure-
ments does not arise when the treatment being evaluated is not life-extending.
2. Impact on Disabled Persons
In many cases, quality of life considerations will favor both currently
disabled patients and patients with the greatest risk of becoming disabled.
Because patients who face severe disability have the most to gain from
successful treatments, they will often profit from a system which ranks
treatments by their impact on quality of life.2" In addition, quality of life
measurements permit plans to consider whether "small" improvements in a
terrible condition are more significant (as a matter of marginal utility) than
"larger" changes in the condition of the person whose health is nearly
perfect.245 Explicit consideration of the impact of disease on a patient's
quality of life would also permit plans to prioritize the care of disabled
persons who suffer more seriously from conditions that would be less serious
in a healthier person. The cumulative effect of chronic conditions on patient
243. A notable exception is John Rawles, who seems to accept the use of QALYs when noncritical
care is prioritized. See Rawles, supra note 16, at 146; see also Stade, supra note 45, at 2015 (failing
to draw the distinction, yet nonetheless using a nonfatal illustration to show the value of QALYs).
244. E.g., Menzel, supra note 44, at 23; Orentlicher, supra note 36, at 312; Note, supra note 226,
at 1310-11.
245. Others doubt the ability of QALYs to prioritize care for those with the greatest need. E.g.,
ROBERT M. VEATCH, The Oregon Experiment: Needless and Real Worries, in RATIONING AMERICA'S
MEDICAL CARE, supra note 35, at 78, 85; Daniels, supra note 33, at 28; Michael Lockwood, Quality
of Life and Resource Allocation, in PHILOsOPHY AND MEDICAL WELFARE, supra note 182, at 33, 45-46.
Although utility calculations would, as these commentators fear, give equal weight to equivalent benefits
regardless of quality of life, the calculation process could, as I suggest in the text, reflect the greater
marginal value of superficially equivalent changes in health status.
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well-being could also be considered. 46 All of these advantages would be
lost if quality of life could not be taken into account.
Quality of life considerations could still disfavor patients under some
circumstances, however. David Orentlicher notes that "[a] permanent disability
will limit the ability of treatment to improve the functional status of persons
with that disability. 2 47 In addition, quality of life considerations will
disfavor persons whose disabilities impair their recovery from other illnesses
(comorbidity) as well as those whose disabilities can be only minimally
relieved by existing therapies.248 As a result, the net impact of quality of
life considerations on disabled persons is unclear.
Still, the use of quality of life considerations for noncritical care will not
stack the deck against disabled patients as it does in the context of critical
care. 249 Because'rank is based on net improvement, not point-in-time quality
of life, a severely disabled patient can receive priority for an effective
treatment despite (and sometimes because of) the impact of that disability on
his quality of life. It is no coincidence that the illustration of impermissible
quality of life usage offered by the National Legal Center for the Medically
Dependent and Disabled in its memo to Representative Chris Smith criticizing
the Oregon Plan involved critical care.250 Its concern about the bias inherent
in quality of life considerations applies only to life-extending care.
3. Conclusions about Noncritical Care
In the context of nonfatal conditions, the egalitarian objections to quality of
life considerations are weak because the lives of disabled patients are not
treated as less valuable than the lives of others. In this context, quality of life
considerations will sometimes favor disabled patients. In addition, quality of
life measurements here do not present the problem of incompleteness that they
do in connection with life-saving care because the nonhealth benefits of being
alive are not at stake. Thus, the objections to quality of life considerations are
materially weaker in the context of noncritical care.
At the same time, the rationale for taking quality of life into account is
powerful. If quality of life considerations were prohibited in the context of
246. The last two advantages seemed to be of special concern to the current administration. See News
Conference with Donna Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, FISC, March 19, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File.
247. Orentlicher, supra note 36, at 312.
248. See David Gauthier, Unequal Need: A Problem of Equity in Access to Health Care, in 2
SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, supra note 20, at 179, 190 (suggesting that quality of life
considerations could disfavor the chronically ill); Robert M. Veatch, Research on "Big Ticket" Items:
Ethical Implications for Equitable Access, 22 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 148, 150 (1994) ("[S]ome people are
so debilitated that it is very inefficient to benefit them."). Fair marginal utility calculations might reduce
this risk along with a fair assessment of the long-term benefits of treatment for chronic conditions.
249. Under Menzel's consent model, the willingness of disabled persons to consent to this more
truncated "QALY bargain" is unclear. On one hand, the benefits of quality of life considerations may
offset the disadvantages. On the other hand, consent may be given only to advantageous uses. Because
my own reasoning does not rely on assumptions about actual or presumed consent, the unbundling
possibility is not central to my conclusions.
250. See Marzen Letter, supra note 46, reprinted in 9 IssuEs L. & MED. at 400.
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noncritical care, then every treatment that improved the patient's condition by
any amount would have to be treated as being equally beneficial, no matter
how trivial the impact on the patient's well-being.25" ' Neither law nor justice
requires this.
As a result, courts will and should conclude that quality of life consider-
ations are permissible in the context of noncritical care, as long as the scales
are unbiased and reasonable accommodation and individualization are
provided.252
CONCLUSION
Any method of rationing potentially beneficial care will involve tragic
choices. But if society cannot afford to fund every medical service that might
conceivably be beneficial, then methodologies designed to maximize the good
that can be done with limited resources have considerable appeal.
Unquestionably, better data and methodologies will be needed before
effectiveness analysis fulfills its potential. But efforts to correct these
deficiencies would be misplaced if the rankings that would result are
intrinsically unjust. The Federal Government's initial rejection of the Oregon
Medicaid experiment called attention to the risk that allocation schemes based
on effectiveness would urifairly discriminate against patients with disabilities..
The defensibility of effectiveness measurements depends upon the criteria
used to measure effectiveness. Quality of life considerations are more
objectionable than other measures of success because they treat the lives of
disabled persons as less valuable than the lives of others. As a result, courts
are likely to conclude that any broad-based use of quality of life consider-
ations to measure the benefits of life-saving care is illegal. But the threat that
quality of life considerations pose to the principle of equal worth when life-
extending care is being evaluated does not exist when noncritical care is being
ranked. As a result, quality of life can properly be used to rank noncritical
care as long as the quality of life scales are accurate and unbiased.
Congress should also consider authorizing the use of quality of life
considerations in extreme cases involving life-sustaining care. Under some
circumstances, the principle of equal worth may demand too great a sacrifice
of medical utility. But movement in this direction should be cautious,
proceeding slowly as the public debates these excruciatingly difficult choices.
Other measures of effectiveness, such as survival rates, that do not take into
account quality of life are more clearly permissible. Even here, however, the
arguments for an egalitarian interpretation of the disability rights laws are
quite powerful. But because survival rates do not reflect invidious stereotypes
and do not violate the principle of equal worth, courts will and should permit
their use.
251. OREGON HEALTH SERVS. COMM'WN, supra note 60, at 17 (noting the marginal improvement
provided by dental services).
252. See supra part III.B.3.
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This endorsement of survival rates has four important qualifications. First,
the rankings must be based on reliable empirical data. Second, although the
prospect is unlikely, the unique statutory language governing employee health
benefits could possibly be construed to prohibit the use of any exclusionary
eligibility criteria in that context. Third, programs using effectiveness criteria
must individualize their decision-making to the maximum extent feasible in
order to avoid unfair generalizations about disabled individuals. Fourth, the
reasonable accommodation requirement may obligate plans to offer riders
which cover less successful treatments.
While I have concluded that effectiveness criteria are sometimes proper, I
do not suggest that effectiveness or cost-effectiveness methodologies should
monopolize the allocation process. Other values and methods will have a
place, sometimes a central place, depending upon the overall mix of values
that a health plan seeks to advance and the specific context of the allocation.
decision. Unfortunately, none of the rationing options is pleasant. Hopefully,
those among us who are optimistic about cost-savings are correct and very
little of this will be necessary. But to the extent that rationing is necessary,
effectiveness belongs among the criteria legally and ethically available to
health planners to make these difficult choices.
1995]
HeinOnline  -- 70 Ind. L.J. 547 1994-1995
HeinOnline  -- 70 Ind. L.J. 548 1994-1995
